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I. INTRODUCTION: DIRECT AND INDIRECT LEGAL EFFECTS 
This Essay examines the effects of the Supreme Court‘s decision in 
National Federation of Independent Business v. Sebelius,
1
 in which the 
Court addressed the constitutionality of the Affordable Care Act.
2
 More 
precisely, what effects will NFIB have on the law—especially 
constitutional law? We can divide these effects into two general 
categories, direct and indirect. ―Direct legal effects‖ are those created by 
and through legal norms. They include the operation of legal orders (the 
mandate in an appellate opinion) and legal rules (stare decisis and the 
doctrine of law of the case). ―Indirect legal effects‖ are mediated by causal 
processes that are not themselves instantiations of legal rules. For 
example, if a legal decision affects politics, and then the political change 
affects the law, that change would constitute an indirect legal effect. 
The Supreme Court‘s decision in NFIB v. Sebelius has already had 
important direct legal consequences—The Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act (ACA) has gone into effect, but with a significant 
 
 
  © 2013 by the author. Permission is hereby granted to make copies (in part or whole) in all 
media, subject only to the requirement that the title, author, and citation information be included in any 
copy. 
  John Carroll Research Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. I owe thanks to 
the participants at a conference of NFIB at Columbia University and a faculty workshop at 
Georgetown University. I am particularly grateful to Jonathan Adler, Randy Barnett, Benjamin Cain, 
Megan Degeneffe, Marc DeGirolami, Laura Donohue, Randy Kozel, David Law, Martin Lederman, 
Trevor Morrison, and Asher Steinberg for helpful comments, criticisms, and suggestions. 
 1. 132 S. Ct. 2566 (2012) [hereinafter NFIB v. Sebelius or NFIB]. 
 2. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, Pub. L. No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119 (2010) 
(codified as amended in scattered sections of 42 U.S.C.). 
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alteration in the incentive provided to the states to expand Medicaid 
coverage and eligibility.
3
 Via the doctrine of vertical stare decisis, NFIB 
could have direct effects in future lower-court cases involving the Anti-
Injunction Act
4
 and the spending power.
5
 On the Commerce Clause and 
Necessary and Proper Clause issues, the direct legal effects are complex 
and likely to be disputed. The strongest argument for a Commerce Clause 
holding postulates that NFIB has stare decisis effects in cases in which 
another individual mandate (relevantly similar to the mandate in the ACA) 
is enforced by a criminal penalty—or other penalty that could not be fairly 
characterized as a tax via a saving construction. 
Whatever direct legal effects the Court‘s decision ultimately produces, 
the thesis of this Essay is that the most important and far-reaching legal 
effects of NFIB are likely to be indirect. NFIB destabilizes what we can 
call the ―constitutional gestalt‖6 regarding the meaning and implications of 
what is referred to as the ―New Deal Settlement.‖7 The idea of a 
 
 
 3. The primary effects of the spending power holding may be on the bargaining processes 
between states and the federal government over waivers from various requirements in the ACA. See 
generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, Federalism by Waiver After the Health Care Case, in THE HEALTH 
CARE CASE: THE SUPREME COURT‘S DECISION AND ITS IMPLICATIONS 227 (Nathaniel Persily et al. 
eds., 2013). 
 4. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006). 
 5. See generally Samuel R. Bagenstos, The Anti-leveraging Principle and the Spending Clause 
After NFIB, 101 GEO. L.J. 861 (2013). 
 6. The phrase ―constitutional gestalt‖ is used here in a technical or stipulated sense, as described 
below. See infra Part IV.C. The phrase itself has rarely been used in legal scholarship. But see Judith 
Resnik, Detention, The War on Terror, and The Federal Courts, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 579, 680 (2010); 
Steven L. Winter, Indeterminacy and Incommensurability in Constitutional Law, 78 CALIF. L. REV. 
1441, 1506 (1990). Subsequent to my articulation of this idea in drafts of this Article and blog posts, 
the notion of a ―constitutional gestalt‖ has been discussed by other legal scholars. See, e.g., Randy E. 
Barnett, No Small Feat: Who Won the Obamacare Case (and Why Did So Many Law Professors Miss 
the Boat)?, 65 FLA. L. REV. 1331 (2013); Josh Blackman, Back to the Future of Originalism, 16 CHAP. 
L. REV. 325, 326, 332–34, 337–40 (2013). 
 7. The phrase ―New Deal Settlement‖ (alternatively, ―New Deal constitutional settlement‖ or 
―New Deal institutional settlement‖) can be used in different ways. Here, I use the phrase to refer to 
two different versions of the constitutional gestalt that frame our understanding of national legislative 
powers. The same phrase can also be used to refer to the historical events during a particular period. 
When used in that way, reference to the New Deal Settlement implicates the truth of particular claims 
about history. In this Essay, I do not make such claims, which may be problematic for a variety of 
reasons. For discussions of the validity of certain historical narratives and related issues, see G. 
Edward White, West Coast Hotel‘s Place in American Constitutional History, 122 YALE L.J. ONLINE 
69 (Sept. 24, 2012), http://yalelawjournal.org/2012/09/24/white.html. For uses of the phrase, see, e.g., 
Jack M. Balkin, ―Wrong the Day It Was Decided‖: Lochner and Constitutional Historicism, 85 B.U. 
L. REV. 677, 685–87 (2005); Michael C. Dorf, Legal Indeterminacy and Institutional Design, 78 
N.Y.U. L. REV. 875, 880 (2003); Ernest A. Young, Popular Constitutionalism and the 
Underenforcement Problem: The Case of the National Healthcare Law, 75 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., 
Issue 3, 2012 at 157, 186–87.  
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/1
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constitutional gestalt will be explored in depth below,
8
 but the basic idea is 
that the gestalt is an interpretive framework that organizes our 
understanding of cases, theories, and narratives; we can think of the 
constitutional gestalt as a very general and abstract map of the 
constitutional landscape. Before NFIB, the consensus understanding was 
that the New Deal and Warren Court cases had established a constitutional 
regime of plenary and virtually unlimited national legislative power under 
the Commerce Clause,
9
 although the regime might also contain narrow 
and limited carve-outs protective of the core of state sovereignty.
10
 After 
NFIB, the constitutional gestalt is unsettled.  
In NFIB, five Justices of the Supreme Court endorsed a view of the 
Commerce Clause
11
 that is inconsistent with the prevailing understanding 
of the constitutional gestalt associated with the New Deal Settlement.
12
 
 
 
 8. See infra Part IV.C. 
 9. See, e.g., ARCHIBALD COX, THE COURT AND THE CONSTITUTION 166 (1987) (observing that 
since 1937, the Court has recognized ―virtually unlimited congressional power to regulate business 
activities under the Commerce Clause‖); Bruce Ackerman & David Golove, Is NAFTA 
Constitutional?, 108 HARV. L. REV. 799, 857 n.255 (1995) (―[Wickard] construed Congress‘s 
commerce powers as virtually unlimited . . . .‖); Matthew Adler, What States Owe Outsiders, 20 
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 391, 431 (1992) (―Congress now has the power to promulgate every kind of 
regulation, including those that were once thought to lie within the state‘s exclusive ‗police‘ power, 
because every kind of regulatory problem may concern out-of-staters.‖); David S. Bloch & William 
Robert Nelson Jr., Defining ―Health‖: Three Visions and Their Ramifications, 1 DEPAUL J. HEALTH 
CARE L. 723, 728 (1997) (characterizing the commerce power as ―an almost unlimited police power‖); 
Kathleen A. Burdette, Making Parents Pay: Interstate Child Support Enforcement after United States 
v. Lopez, 144 U. PA. L. REV. 1469, 1477 (1996) (―Since the New Deal, Congress has had virtually 
unlimited power to regulate under the Commerce Clause . . . .‖); Paul G. Kauper, Supreme Court: 
Trends in Constitutional Interpretation, 24 F.R.D. 155, 157 (1959–60) (―[T]he key decisions under the 
Commerce Clause . . . resulted in a great and apparently unlimited expansion of federal authority to 
deal with the nation‘s economic problems.‖); Stephen Chippendale, Note, More Harm than Good: 
Assessing Federalization of Criminal Law, 79 MINN. L. REV. 455, 460 (1994) (―[C]ongressional 
power under the Commerce Clause has emerged as virtually unlimited.‖); Alan N. Greenspan, Note, 
The Constitutional Exercise of the Federal Police Power: A Functional Approach to Federalism, 41 
VAND. L. REV. 1019, 1020–21 (1988) (―The rational basis test supports legislation that regulates 
purely local behavior for the purpose of promoting or protecting the public health, welfare, or 
morality. . . . Not only has the commerce clause become the source of federal police power, it has 
become an unlimited source.‖) (footnotes omitted); Kenneth S. Weitzman, Comment, Copyright and 
Patent Clause of the Constitution: Does Congress Have the Authority to Abrogate State Eleventh 
Amendment Sovereign Immunity After Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.?, 2 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 
297, 333 (1991) (―Pursuant to the commerce clause, congressional authority is extremely broad, if not 
virtually unlimited today, and nearly anything even remotely connected with interstate commerce is 
subject to Congress‘ plenary powers.‖). 
 10. See infra Part IV.D.1. 
 11. See NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2585–93 (2012) (opinion of Roberts, C.J.); id. at 
2644–50 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 12. This constitutional gestalt can be called the ―Dynamic New Deal Settlement.‖ See infra Part 
IV.D.1. The core idea is that national legislative power is plenary and virtually unlimited and that the 
power will expand over time to accommodate novel assertions of power by Congress. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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Endorsement of this view by a majority of the Court opens a fissure in 
constitutional politics, creating space for an alternative constitutional 
gestalt. The core idea of the alternative view is that the New Deal 
Settlement did not create plenary and virtually unlimited legislative power. 
Instead, the alternative understanding is that the New Deal and Warren 
Court cases establish only the constitutionality of particular federal 
programs, specific zones of federal power, and particular modes of federal 
regulation. The most important indirect effect of NFIB is that it enables 
constitutional contestation
13
 over the content of the gestalt and the 
meaning of the New Deal Settlement. 
The remainder of this Essay is organized as follows. Part II analyzes 
the structure of the opinions in NFIB, and Part III examines the direct legal 
effects that these opinions will produce. This discussion may seem dry and 
technical, even to Supreme Court enthusiasts. We will examine what is 
called the ―mandate‖—the direct legal command contained in the opinion 
of the Court and its implications for the vertical law-of-the-case effects of 
NFIB. We then will turn to the doctrine of vertical stare decisis, which will 
require us to examine the convoluted structure of the various opinions in 
the case. That will lead to the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis—the 
precedential effect of NFIB on future decisions of the Supreme Court 
itself. 
* * * 
Readers who are familiar with the complex structure of the opinions in 
NFIB may wish to proceed directly to Part III on page 16, discussing 
direct legal effects, including the vertical and horizontal stare decisis 
effects of the decision. Other readers may wish to proceed directly to Part 
IV on page 37, which discusses the effect of the decision on the 
constitutional gestalt. 
* * * 
The technical analysis in Part III leads to the conclusion that on the 
Commerce Clause issue, NFIB is unlikely to produce stare decisis effects 
that are clear and uncontested—one way or the other. That conclusion has 
 
 
 13. The phrase ―constitutional contestation‖ is used infrequently in legal scholarship. For an 
early example, see Reva B. Siegel, Text in Contest: Gender and the Constitution from a Social 
Movement Perspective, 150 U. PA. L. REV. 297, 303 (2001). In this Essay, my use of the phrase is 
influenced by the account of constitutional contestation offered by Mariah Zeisberg. See MARIAH 
ZEISBERG, WAR POWERS: THE POLITICS OF CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY (2013). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/1
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an implication: NFIB opens up space for constitutional contestation. That 
space is then examined in Part IV, which is about the indirect legal effects 
of NFIB. We begin by examining the idea of a constitutional gestalt—a 
highly abstract feature of constitutional thought and discourse that unifies 
constitutional theories, narratives, and doctrines. We then turn to the 
effects of NFIB on the stability of the constitutional gestalt associated with 
the New Deal Settlement. This leads to the core idea of the essay—that 
NFIB destabilizes the constitutional gestalt, potentially (but not 
necessarily) enabling a constitutional gestalt shift. Part V integrates the 
discussion of direct and indirect effects and draws some speculative 
conclusions about the future of constitutional discourse and politics. 
II. THE CASE AND THE OPINIONS 
Before we examine the effects of the Supreme Court‘s decision of 
NFIB v. Sebelius, it is necessary to unpack the issues and opinions. The 
first step is the usual, but hopefully brief, recitation of the facts and 
procedural history.
14
 
A. The Facts and Procedural History 
The ACA was enacted by Congress in 2010. It is a complex statute—
hundreds of provisions and some nine hundred pages in length. Two 
provisions of the ACA were challenged. The first was the individual 
mandate, which required certain individuals to purchase qualifying health 
insurance.
15
 The second challenged provision was the Medicaid expansion, 
a portion of which effectively required states to provide Medicaid 
coverage to adults with incomes up to 133 percent of the federal poverty 
level by withdrawing all federal Medicaid funds from noncomplying 
states.
16
 
The day the ACA was signed into law, thirteen states filed a complaint 
in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Florida. The 
original plaintiffs were later joined by an additional thirteen states, the 
 
 
 14. A detailed exploration of the history of NFIB v. Sebelius is provided by JOSH BLACKMAN, 
UNPRECEDENTED: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO OBAMACARE (2013). An important source 
of scholarly commentary is found in a recent anthology edited by Nathaniel Persily, Gillian E. 
Metzger, and Trevor W. Morrison. See THE HEALTH CARE CASE, supra note 3. Another perspective on 
the history of the case if offered by a compilation of blog posts from the Volokh Conspiracy. See 
RANDY E. BARNETT ET AL., A CONSPIRACY AGAINST OBAMACARE: THE VOLOKH CONSPIRACY AND 
THE HEALTH CARE CASE (Trevor Burrus ed., 2013). 
 15. 26 U.S.C. § 5000A (Supp. IV 2010). 
 16. 42 U.S.C. §§ 1396a, 1396c (2006). 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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National Federation of Independent Business, and several individuals.
17
 
The District Court held that Congress lacked legislative power to enact the 
individual mandate, and that the mandate could not be severed—resulting 
in an order that struck down the Act in its entirety.
18
 The United States 
Court of Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit affirmed the determination that 
Congress lacked legislative power to enact the individual mandate, but 
reversed the determination that the mandate was not severable.
19
 The 
Eleventh Circuit also rejected the challenge to the Medicaid expansion 
provisions.
20
 Two other circuits rejected challenges to the individual 
mandate. 
21
 One circuit held that the Anti-Injunction Act created a 
jurisdictional bar to the challenge.
22
 The United States Supreme Court 
granted certiorari in the Eleventh Circuit cases.
23
 
The Supreme Court held that the Anti-Injunction Act was not a barrier 
to the challenge to the mandate and upheld the related penalty provision of 
the ACA on the basis of the tax power.
24
 In addition, a portion of Justice 
Roberts‘s opinion that was joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan,25 in 
conjunction with the joint dissent by Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, 
and Alito,
26
 effectively establishes the unconstitutionality of the ACA‘s 
Medicaid expansion provisions to the extent that these provisions threaten 
states with the loss of existing Medicaid funding. 
Formally, there are four opinions in NFIB v. Sebelius, but different 
constellations of Justices join different portions of these four opinions. 
Functionally, we can identify seven distinct opinions—each joined by a 
different set of Justices. These seven functional opinions address five 
distinct issues. The clearest way to reduce the opinions‘ complexity is to 
outline their structure and relationship to the issues.  
 
 
 17. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2580 (2012). 
 18. Florida ex rel. Bondi v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 780 F. Supp. 2d 1256, 1306 
(N.D. Fla. 2011). 
 19. Florida ex rel. Att‘y Gen. v. U.S. Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., 648 F.3d 1235, 1328 
(11th Cir. 2011).  
 20. Id. at 1268. 
 21. See Seven-Sky v. Holder, 661 F.3d 1, 15–20 (D.C. Cir. 2011); Thomas More Law Ctr. v. 
Obama, 651 F.3d 529, 549 (6th Cir. 2011). 
 22. Liberty Univ., Inc. v. Geithner, 671 F.3d 391, 414–15 (4th Cir. 2011). 
 23. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2582 (citing Nat‘l Fed‘n of Indep. Bus. v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 603 
(2011)). 
 24. Id. at 2594–2600. 
 25. Id. at 2601–08 (opinion of Roberts, C.J., joined by Breyer & Kagan, JJ.). 
 26. Id. at 2642–77 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/1
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B. Functionally, Seven Opinions on Five Issues 
The following overview will identify the seven opinions and the five 
issues. To understand the opinions, it is necessary first to identify the five 
issues addressed by the Court, presented as Table 1: Issues in NFIB v. 
Sebelius. 
TABLE 1: ISSUES IN NFIB V. SEBELIUS 
Issue Question Outcome 
Anti-Injunction Act Did the Anti-Injunction Act 
bar the challenge to the 
individual mandate? 
No, holding in the 
opinion of the Court. 
Commerce Clause Was the individual mandate 
within Congress‘s Commerce 
Clause power? 
Disputed. Five justices 
say ―no.‖ 
Necessary and 
Proper Clause 
Was the individual mandate 
within Congress‘s power 
pursuant to the Necessary and 
Proper Clause? 
Disputed. Five justices 
say ―no.‖ 
Tax Power Was the individual mandate 
supported by Congress‘s tax 
power? 
Yes, either directly or 
via a saving 
construction. 
Spending Power Was the requirement that 
states expand Medicaid or 
lose existing Medicaid 
funding supported by 
Congress‘s spending power? 
No. Three justices join 
an opinion answering 
no, and five justices 
would strike the 
Medicaid provisions 
down in their entirety. 
 
Step two is to identify the distinct opinions. There are four formal 
opinions with six authors; they function, however, as seven distinct 
opinions. Justice Roberts authored an opinion, portions of which were the 
opinion of the Court. Justice Ginsburg authored an opinion, different parts 
of which were joined by different Justices. There was a joint dissenting 
opinion authored by Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Finally, Justice 
Thomas had a separate dissenting opinion.
27
  
 
 
 27. Here is the official statement: 
 ROBERTS, C.J., announced the judgment of the Court and delivered the opinion of the 
Court with respect to Parts I, II, and III-C, in which GINSBURG, BREYER, SOTOMAYOR, 
and KAGAN, JJ., joined; an opinion with respect to Part IV, in which BREYER and 
KAGAN, JJ., joined; and an opinion with respect to Parts III-A, III-B, and III-D. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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This complex structure of the opinions can be unpacked as a table: 
TABLE 2: STRUCTURE OF THE OPINIONS 
Author Parts of the 
Opinion 
Joined by 
(Total, Names) 
Issues Formal Status 
Roberts I, II, III-C 5 Ginsburg, 
Breyer, 
Sotomayor, 
Kagan 
Anti-Injunction Act Opinion of the 
Court Tax Power 
Roberts Preface, III-A, 
III-B, III-D, 
Conclusion 
1 None Role of the Court Separate Opinion 
Commerce Clause 
Necessary and Proper 
Clause 
Tax Power and the 
Avoidance Canon 
Relationship of 
Commerce Clause 
Analysis to Tax Power 
Holding 
The Court‘s Holding 
and Mandate 
Roberts IV 3 Breyer, 
Kagan, 
Spending Power Separate Opinion 
Ginsburg I, II, III, IV 4 Breyer, 
Kagan, 
Sotomayor 
Commerce Clause Concurring in 
Part, Concurring 
in the Judgment Necessary and Proper 
Clause 
Tax Power 
Ginsburg V 2 Sotomayor Spending Power Dissenting in Part 
Joint 
Opinion 
Entirety 4 Kennedy, 
Scalia, 
Thomas, 
Alito 
Anti-Injunction Act Dissenting 
Opinion Commerce Clause 
Necessary and Proper 
Clause 
Spending Power 
Thomas Entirety 1 None Commerce Clause Dissenting 
Opinion Necessary and Proper 
Clause 
  
 
 
GINSBURG, J., filed an opinion concurring in part, concurring in the judgment in part, and 
dissenting in part, in which SOTOMAYOR, J., joined, and in which BREYER and KAGAN, 
JJ., joined as to Parts I, II, III, and IV. SCALIA, KENNEDY, THOMAS, and ALITO, JJ., 
filed a dissenting opinion. THOMAS, J., filed a dissenting opinion. 
Id. at 2575 (syllabus). 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/1
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C. The Seven Functionally Distinct Opinions 
The next step is to summarize each of the seven functionally distinct 
opinions with respect to the five issues. 
1. The Opinion of the Court 
The opinion of the Court is contained in Parts I, II, and III-C of the 
opinion authored by Chief Justice Roberts. Part I is simply a summary of 
the facts and procedural history.
28
 This part of the Court‘s opinion is not 
decisive in determing of the direct or indirect legal effects, with the 
obvious exception that the facts may limit the reach of the holding. 
Part II addresses the Anti-Injunction Act, which provides, ―[N]o suit 
for the purpose of restraining the assessment or collection of any tax shall 
be maintained in any court by any person, whether or not such person is 
the person against whom such tax was assessed.‖29 The Court‘s conclusion 
was straightforward: ―The Affordable Care Act does not require that the 
penalty for failing to comply with the individual mandate be treated as a 
tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act. The Anti-Injunction Act 
therefore does not apply to this suit, and we may proceed to the merits.‖30 
The only complexity to be noted is that the holding that the ACA was not 
a tax for purposes of the Anti-Injunction Act might be thought to be in 
some tension with the holding that the individual mandate was a tax for 
the purposes of Congress‘s tax power. 
Part III-C of the opinion of the Court addresses the tax power. There 
are two steps to the argument: (1) the shared responsibility payment 
enforcing the individual mandates can be characterized as a tax supported 
by the power conferred by Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution;
31
 and 
(2) so characterized, the provision is not a direct tax in violation of Article 
I, Section 9, Clause 4.
32
 The upshot of Part III-C is that the shared 
responsibility payment associated with the individual mandate is within 
Congress‘s Article I legislative power.  
 
 
 28. Id. at 2580–82. 
 29. 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a) (2006). 
 30. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2584. 
 31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 1. 
 32. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 4, amended by U.S. CONST. amend. XVI. 
Washington University Open Scholarship
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2. Justice Roberts‘s Separate Opinion on the Commerce Clause and 
the Necessary and Proper Clause 
Some portions of Justice Roberts‘s opinion are entirely his own, joined 
by no other members of the Court. Structurally, these portions are 
contained in five distinct parts of his opinion: 
1. a preface, addressing the role of the Supreme Court; 
2. Part III-A, addressing the argument that the individual mandate 
is supported by the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper 
Clause; 
3. Part III-B, addressing the avoidance canon in relationship to the 
tax power;  
4. Part III-D, addressing the necessity of the Commerce Clause and 
Necessary and Proper Clause analyses to the Court‘s disposition of 
the case; and 
5. a conclusion, addressing the holding and mandate. 
Three of these distinct parts are critical to understanding the legal 
effects of Justice Roberts‘s opinion. Part III-A contains his analysis of the 
Commerce Clause: he concludes that the individual mandate (construed as 
a legal requirement enforced by a penalty) is not a regulation of interstate 
commerce.
33
 Justice Roberts articulated the key distinction between 
permissible regulations of activity and impermissible mandates premised 
on inactivity as follows: 
 The individual mandate, however, does not regulate existing 
commercial activity. It instead compels individuals to become active 
in commerce by purchasing a product, on the ground that their 
failure to do so affects interstate commerce. Construing the 
Commerce Clause to permit Congress to regulate individuals 
precisely because they are doing nothing would open a new and 
potentially vast domain to congressional authority. Every day 
individuals do not do an infinite number of things. In some cases 
they decide not to do something; in others they simply fail to do it. 
Allowing Congress to justify federal regulation by pointing to the 
effect of inaction on commerce would bring countless decisions an 
individual could potentially make within the scope of federal 
 
 
 33. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2584–93. 
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol91/iss1/1
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regulation, and—under the Government‘s theory—empower 
Congress to make those decisions for him.
34
 
In other words, because the individual mandate was not predicated on 
some form of activity, it did not qualify as a regulation of commerce. 
Justice Roberts then turned to the government‘s Necessary and Proper 
Clause argument. Roberts‘s reasoning flows from the activity-inactivity 
distinction. The individual mandate provisions of the ACA do not regulate 
economic activity; instead they require individuals to engage in the 
purchase of health insurance:
35
 
 Applying these principles, the individual mandate cannot be 
sustained under the Necessary and Proper Clause as an essential 
component of the insurance reforms. Each of our prior cases 
upholding laws under that Clause involved exercises of authority 
derivative of, and in service to, a granted power. . . . The individual 
mandate, by contrast, vests Congress with the extraordinary ability 
to create the necessary predicate to the exercise of an enumerated 
power.
36
 
And if the mandate were constitutional: 
No longer would Congress be limited to regulating under the 
Commerce Clause those who by some preexisting activity bring 
themselves within the sphere of federal regulation. Instead, 
Congress could reach beyond the natural limit of its authority and 
draw within its regulatory scope those who otherwise would be 
outside of it. Even if the individual mandate is ―necessary‖ to the 
 
 
 34. Id. at 2587. 
 35. The distinction between activity and inactivity was advanced by the plaintiffs, Brief for the 
Private Respondents on the Individual Mandate at 15, Dep‘t of Health & Human Servs., v. Florida, 
No. 11-398, 2012 WL 379586 (U.S Feb. 6, 2012) [hereinafter Private Respondents‘ Brief], as a basis 
for distinguishing the Supreme Court‘s prior decision in Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), on 
the basis of language in United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598 (2000). In those decisions, the Court had limited the substantial effects doctrine from 
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127–29, to cases involving the regulation of economic activity. See Lopez, 514 
U.S. at 559; Morrison, 529 U.S. at 619. Plaintiff‘s argued that the Affordable Care Act regulated 
―inactivity‖—the failure to engage in the action of purchasing insurance, and hence that extension of 
cumulative effects doctrine was not required by Wickard as it had been limited by Lopez and 
Morrison. Private Respondents‘ Brief at 15, 22–25. For analysis of the activity-inactivity distinction, 
see John Valauri, Baffled by Inactivity: The Individual Mandate and the Commerce Power, 10 GEO. J. 
L. & PUB. POL‘Y 51 (2012). 
 36. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2592. 
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Act‘s insurance reforms, such an expansion of federal power is not 
a ―proper‖ means for making those reforms effective.37 
Thus, the individual mandate was neither a regulation of interstate 
commerce nor a proper means of carrying other provisions of the ACA 
into effect. 
3. Justice Roberts‘s Separate Opinion on the Spending Clause, Joined 
by Justices Breyer and Kagan 
Part IV of Justice Roberts‘s opinion, addressing the Spending Clause 
issue, was joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan. The core of the reasoning 
is contained in the following passage: 
 In this case, the financial ―inducement‖ Congress has chosen is 
much more than ―relatively mild encouragement‖—it is a gun to the 
head. Section 1396c of the Medicaid Act provides that if a State‘s 
Medicaid plan does not comply with the Act‘s requirements, the 
Secretary of Health and Human Services may declare that ―further 
payments will not be made to the State.‖ A State that opts out of the 
Affordable Care Act‘s expansion in health care coverage thus stands 
to lose not merely ―a relatively small percentage‖ of its existing 
Medicaid funding, but all of it. Medicaid spending accounts for 
over 20 percent of the average State‘s total budget, with federal 
funds covering 50 to 83 percent of those costs. . . . The threatened 
loss of over 10 percent of a State‘s overall budget . . . is economic 
dragooning that leaves the States with no real option but to 
acquiesce in the Medicaid expansion.
38
 
Justice Roberts‘s opinion extends South Dakota v. Dole,39 which upheld 
under the spending power a provision authorizing the Secretary of 
Transportation to withhold five percent of federal transportation funds 
from any state that failed to set its minimum drinking age at twenty-one.
40
 
Chief Justice Rehnquist‘s opinion for the Court stated, ―[I]n some 
circumstances the financial inducement offered by Congress might be so 
coercive as to pass the point at which ‗pressure turns into compulsion.‘‖41 
 
 
 37. Id. 
 38. Id. at 2604–05 (internal citations omitted). 
 39. 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 40. Id. at 206, 211–12. 
 41. Id. at 211 (quoting Steward Mach. Co. v. Davis, 301 U.S. 548, 590 (1937)). 
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There is already substantial controversy about the best reading of this 
portion of the opinion. Because four Justices would have held the 
Medicaid expansion provisions invalid in their entirety, this portion of 
Justice Roberts‘s opinion is clearly controlling under the narrowest 
grounds rule.
42
 What is not so clear is what the vertical stare decisis effects 
will be—an issue that is discussed below. 
4. Justice Ginsburg‘s Opinion on the Commerce Clause, Necessary 
and Proper Clause, and Tax Power Issues 
The entirety of Justice Ginsburg‘s concurring and dissenting opinion 
was joined by Justice Sotomayor.
43
 Parts I, II, III, and IV were also joined 
by Justices Breyer and Kagan
44
: these sections address the national power 
issues (Commerce, Tax, and the Necessary and Proper Clause). Justice 
Ginsburg‘s analysis of the national power issues begins with the 
Commerce Clause, about which she makes two observations: ―First, 
Congress has the power to regulate economic activities ‗that substantially 
affect interstate commerce.‘‖45 And, ―[s]econd, we owe a large measure of 
respect to Congress when it frames and enacts economic and social 
legislation.‖46 Applying these observations to the facts of NFIB, Ginsburg 
concludes: 
 Straightforward application of these principles would require the 
Court to hold that the minimum coverage provision is proper 
Commerce Clause legislation. Beyond dispute, Congress had a 
rational basis for concluding that the uninsured, as a class, 
substantially affect interstate commerce. Those without insurance 
consume billions of dollars of health-care products and services 
each year. Those goods are produced, sold, and delivered largely by 
national and regional companies who routinely transact business 
across state lines. The uninsured also cross state lines to receive 
care. Some have medical emergencies while away from home. 
Others, when sick, go to a neighboring State that provides better 
care for those who have not prepaid for care.
47
 
 
 
 42. See infra note 95 and accompanying text. 
 43. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609. 
 44. Id. 
 45. Id. at 2616 (Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting) (quoting Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1, 
17 (2005)). 
 46. Id. (referring to Raich, 545 U.S. at 17). 
 47. Id. at 2617 (citations omitted). 
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Most of the remainder of her opinion consists of responses to and 
criticisms of the reasoning in Justice Roberts‘s opinion. But notably, in 
responding to Justice Roberts‘s contention that allowing Congress to 
mandate purchases is necessary to avoid an interpretation of the 
Commerce Clause that would be unlimited, Justice Ginsburg endorses the 
Court‘s decisions in Lopez and Morrison because they exclude 
―regulat[ion] [of] noneconomic conduct that has only an attenuated effect 
on interstate commerce and is traditionally left to state law‖ from the 
commerce power.
48
 
Justice Ginsburg also argues that the individual mandate would be 
sustainable under the Necessary and Proper Clause, even if it were not 
itself a regulation of interstate commerce.
49
 Part IV of her opinion 
addresses the larger implications of Justice Roberts‘s opinion: 
 In the early 20th century, this Court regularly struck down 
economic regulation enacted by the peoples‘ representatives in both 
the States and the Federal Government. THE CHIEF JUSTICE‘s 
Commerce Clause opinion, and even more so the joint dissenters‘ 
reasoning, bear a disquieting resemblance to those long-overruled 
decisions.
50
 
This portion of Justice Ginsburg‘s opinion suggests that the Chief Justice‘s 
approach undermines the New Deal Settlement—a theme to which we 
shall return below.
51
 
5. Justice Ginsburg‘s Opinion on the Spending Power Issue 
Part V of Justice Ginsburg‘s opinion, joined only by Justice 
Sotomayor, addresses the Medicaid expansion and the Spending Clause.
52
 
Of the nine members of the Court, only Ginsburg and Sotomayor would 
uphold the conditioning of Medicaid funds on state cooperation with the 
Medicaid expansion required by the ACA.
53
 
One theme in this portion of Justice Ginsburg‘s opinion is cooperative 
federalism. In this context, the suggestion is that the alternative to 
conditional spending is federalization, which would provide a constricted 
 
 
 48. Id. at 2623 (citations omitted). 
 49. Id. at 2625–28. 
 50. Id. at 2628–29 (citations omitted). 
 51. See infra Part IV.D. 
 52. NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2629–42 (Ginsburg, J., concurring and dissenting). 
 53. See id. at 2630. 
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role for the states.
54
 Ginsburg argues that the Court‘s conditional spending 
precedents do not support the Chief Justice‘s distinction between old and 
new Medicaid funds.
55
 Justice Ginsburg also argues that coercion was not 
present because conditioned funds were only Medicaid funds (and not 
unrelated funds)
56
 and because there is no judicially manageable standard 
for ―coercion.‖57 
6. The Joint Dissent 
The joint dissenting opinion, authored by Justices Scalia, Kennedy, 
Thomas, and Alito, addresses the Commerce Clause, tax power, Anti-
Injunction Act, and Medicaid expansion issues, as well as severability, 
concluding that the entire ACA should be struck down.
58
 
The joint dissent argues that the individual mandate exceeds 
Congress‘s power under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause for reasons that are similar to, but distinct from, those 
offered by the Chief Justice. Adopting the premise that Congress‘s 
legislative power must be limited, the joint dissent argues that extending 
the power to include mandates to participate in the market would create 
power without limits.
59
 This limit applies to the Necessary and Proper 
Clause as well: ―[T]he scope of the Necessary and Proper Clause is 
exceeded not only when the congressional action directly violates the 
sovereignty of the States but also when it violates the background 
principle of enumerated (and hence limited) federal power.‖60 
On the tax power issue, the joint dissent‘s key move is the argument 
that the penalty provision could not fairly be interpreted as a tax because it 
is triggered by a violation of the law.
61
 On the Anti-Injunction Act, the 
joint dissent argued that its analysis of the tax power question essentially 
disposed of the jurisdictional question as well.
62
 On the Medicaid 
expansion issue, the reasoning of the joint dissent is very close to that of 
the Chief Justice, emphasizing that the sheer size of Medicaid funding 
makes any condition on its receipt coercive.
63
 The joint dissent‘s 
 
 
 54. Id. at 2632–33. 
 55. Id. at 2635–36. 
 56. Id. at 2634. 
 57. Id. at 2641. 
 58. Id. at 2677 (joint opinion of Scalia, Kennedy, Thomas & Alito, JJ., dissenting). 
 59. Id. at 2646. 
 60. Id. 
 61. Id. at 2651–52. 
 62. Id. at 2655–56. 
 63. Id. at 2662–64. 
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discussion of the severability issue is complex and will not be summarized 
here.
64
 
7. Justice Thomas‘s Opinion 
The final opinion was authored by Justice Thomas. The sole point of 
this opinion was to restate Justice Thomas‘s longstanding objection to the 
substantial effects doctrine and to express his belief that the reasoning of 
Wickard v. Filburn
65
 should be explicitly repudiated by the Court.
66
 
* * * 
In summary, there are seven, functionally distinct opinions. These 
amount to an opinion of the Court on the Anti-Injunction Act and the tax 
power. Additionally, a majority of Justices align on the invalidity of the 
individual mandate under the Commerce Clause and the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, albeit in two distinct opinions. Given that a total of three 
Justices support the invalidation of conditioning of new funds on state 
acceptance of Medicaid expansion and that four Justices support the 
invalidation of so-conditioning any funds, it follows that seven Justices 
would support the narrower outcome (striking down the new funds 
condition) in the Chief Justice‘s opinion. 
III. DIRECT LEGAL EFFECTS: THE MANDATE AND STARE DECISIS 
What are the direct legal effects of NFIB? Direct legal effects are the 
legal norms created by the Supreme Court‘s decision and the Justices‘ 
opinions. We can divide direct effects into three categories. The first and 
most immediate legal effects are the result of what is called the ―mandate‖ 
and the associated doctrine of law of the case.
67
 A second set of legal 
effects is created by the doctrine of vertical stare decisis as it affects the 
lower federal courts and the courts of the several states.
68
 A third set of 
 
 
 64. See id. at 2668–76. 
 65. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 66. See NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2677 (Thomas, J., dissenting); see also United States v. Morrison, 
529 U.S. 598, 627 (2000) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 67. See James Wm. Moore & Robert Stephen Oglebay, The Supreme Court, Stare Decisis and 
Law of the Case, 21 TEX. L. REV. 514 (1943). 
 68. See Evan H. Caminker, Why Must Inferior Courts Obey Superior Court Precedents?, 46 
STAN. L. REV. 817, 823–24 (1994); Michael C. Dorf, Dicta and Article III, 142 U. PA. L. REV. 1997, 
2025 (1994); Mark Alan Thurmon, Note, When the Court Divides: Reconsidering the Precedential 
Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 42 DUKE L.J. 419, 436–37 (1992). The doctrine of 
vertical stare decisis may have different implications for state courts, but it is clear that state courts are 
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legal effects is created by the doctrine of horizontal stare decisis—the 
doctrine of precedent applied by the Supreme Court to its own prior 
decisions.
69
 
A. The Mandate and Law of the Case 
The most direct legal effect of a Supreme Court decision is achieved 
via the mandate—the formal direction the Court gives to the lower federal 
courts in the case.
70
 (The discussion that follows uses the term ―mandate‖ 
in this sense—not to be confused with the ―individual mandate,‖ to which 
I shall always refer by using the whole two-word phrase.) In Supreme 
Court decisions, the mandate is a function of the judgment, which is 
announced at the end of the opinion.
71
 Because of the fragmented nature of 
the opinions, the precise content of the mandate in NFIB requires a careful 
parsing of the various opinions. It has at least three distinct components: 
(1) affirming the Eleventh Circuit‘s rejection of the Anti-Injunction Act 
challenge to the district court‘s jurisdiction; (2) reversing the Eleventh 
Circuit‘s decision that the penalty provision enforcing the individual 
mandate of the ACA was beyond the legislative power of Congress; and 
(3) affirming in part and reversing in part the Eleventh Circuit‘s 
determination that the Medicaid expansion provision was within 
Congress‘s power. Formally, this portion of the opinion is expressed in the 
final passages of Justice Roberts‘s opinion, ―The judgment of the Court of 
Appeals for the Eleventh Circuit is affirmed in part and reversed in part. It 
is so ordered.‖72 
Because we need to refer to the various portions of Justice Roberts‘s 
opinion, it may be helpful to briefly summarize the sections in the form of 
a chart:  
 
 
bound by the decisions of the United States Supreme Court on questions of federal law. See, e.g., Am. 
Tradition P‘ship, Inc. v. Bullock, 132 S. Ct. 2490 (2012). 
 69. See William S. Consovoy, The Rehnquist Court and the End of Constitutional Stare Decisis: 
Casey, Dickerson and the Consequences of Pragmatic Adjudication, 2002 UTAH L. REV. 53, 57–58. 
 70. When the Court exercises appellate or certiorari jurisdiction, its formal mandate binds the 
lower federal courts, but the Court does not address its orders to the parties. Trial courts can issue 
coercive orders to the parties, and the content of such orders may be controlled by the Supreme 
Court‘s mandate directed to lower courts. 
 71. See, e.g., NFIB, 132 S. Ct. at 2609. 
 72. Id. 
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TABLE 3: STRUCTURE OF JUSTICE ROBERTS‘S OPINION 
Part of the Opinion Topic Addressed Status 
Part I Facts and Procedural History Opinion of the Court 
Part II Anti-Injunction Act Opinion of the Court 
Part III-A Commerce Clause and 
Necessary and Proper Clause 
Justice Roberts 
Part III-B Tax Power Justice Roberts 
Part III-C Tax Power Opinion of the Court 
Part III-D Necessity of Part III-A Justice Roberts 
Part IV Spending Power Justice Roberts joined by 
Justices Breyer and Kagan 
The first component of the mandate follows directly from Part II of 
Justice Roberts‘s opinion; this Part was joined by Justices Ginsburg, 
Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan and hence constitutes the opinion of the 
Court.
73
 This Part directly affirms the Eleventh Circuit on the Anti-
Injunction Act issue.
74
 The second component of the mandate follows 
from Part III-C of Justice Roberts‘s opinion joined by the same four 
Justices, which reverses the Eleventh Circuit‘s decision insofar as it failed 
to adopt a saving construction of the individual mandate.
75
 The third 
component of the mandate is more complex. Part IV of Justice Roberts‘s 
opinion, joined by Justices Breyer and Kagan, concludes that the Medicaid 
expansion, which threatened states with the loss of their existing Medicaid 
funding if they declined to comply with the provisions of the ACA that 
expanded the scope of the Medicaid program and increased the number of 
individuals the states must cover as a condition of their receipt of federal 
funds, violates the Constitution.
76
 Because four Justices (Kennedy, Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito) would have struck down the entire ACA,
77
 Part IV of 
Justice Roberts‘s opinion would control in subsequent proceedings in the 
lower federal courts.
78
 The consequence is that preexisting Medicaid 
funding cannot be denied to states that do not implement the Medicaid 
expansion provisions of the ACA. 
 
 
 73. Id. at 2575. 
 74. Id. at 2582–84. 
 75. Id. at 2594–2600. 
 76. Id. at 2601–08. 
 77. See id. at 2642–77. 
 78. This flows from the narrowest grounds rule, discussed below. See infra Part III.B.2 and 
Novak, infra note 98, at 760–61. See also Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
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The immediate legal effect of the mandate is accompanied by 
additional legal consequences that flow from the closely related doctrine 
called the ―law of the case.‖79 The law-of-the-case doctrine has two 
dimensions, which we can call ―vertical‖ and ―horizontal.‖80 The vertical 
dimension of the law-of-the-case doctrine requires any lower court in 
subsequent proceedings in the NFIB case itself to follow the Supreme 
Court‘s determinations.81 The horizontal dimension of the law-of-the-case 
doctrine would apply to the Supreme Court itself if any portion of NFIB 
should return to the Court on a subsequent appeal, but is not binding: the 
Court has the power to reverse itself on issues determined in a prior 
decision in the same case.
82
 
The law-of-the-case doctrine (a cousin of the doctrine of issue 
preclusion or collateral estoppel) only applies to issues that were actually 
decided,
83
 and hence has no relevance to issues not presented to the Court 
in NFIB, including, for example, the question of whether the penalty 
provision enforcing the individual mandate violates the Origination Clause 
of Article I. 
In practice, the most important, direct, and immediate effects of the 
Supreme Court‘s decision in NFIB are produced by the mandate and the 
vertical law-of-the-case doctrine. As a consequence of the mandate, the 
penalty provisions will go into effect, absent the success of a legal 
challenge on some basis not considered by the Court in NFIB. If any state 
chooses not to accept Congress‘s offer of Medicaid funding for the new 
beneficiary classes, that state will not be subject to the possible withdrawal 
of funding for the pre-2010 classes of beneficiaries.
84
  
 
 
 79. 18 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE‘S FEDERAL PRACTICE ¶ 134.23[1] (Matthew Bender 
3d ed. 2011). 
 80. See Thomas L. Fowler & Thomas P. Davis, Reconsideration of Interlocutory Orders: A 
Critical Reassessment of Calloway v. Ford Motor Co. and Whether One Judge May Overrule Another, 
78 N.C. L. REV. 1797, 1814 n.49 (2000).  
 81. See Joseph W. Mead, Stare Decisis in the Inferior Courts of the United States, 12 NEV. L.J. 
787, 788 (2012). 
 82. Consovoy, supra note 69, at 57–59. 
 83. See, e.g., Wilmer v. Bd. of Cnty. Comm‘rs of Leavenworth Cnty., 69 F.3d 406, 409 (10th 
Cir. 1995) (―[O]nly matters actually decided, explicitly or implicitly, become law of the case . . . .‖) 
(citing Guidry v. Sheet Metal Workers Int‘l Ass‘n, Local 9, 10 F.3d 700, 705 (10th Cir. 1993)). 
 84. I owe thanks to Martin Lederman for this precise formulation of the effects of the mandate 
with respect to the Spending Clause. 
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B. Vertical Stare Decisis 
Supreme Court decisions create a second kind of direct legal effect as a 
consequence of the doctrine of vertical stare decisis, or precedent. Vertical 
stare decisis operates with respect to issues of federal law and binds courts 
that are lower than the Supreme Court in the hierarchy of authority—that 
is, the lower federal courts and the courts of the several states. By contrast, 
horizontal stare decisis operates within a court. The Supreme Court is not 
bound by horizontal stare decisis—more on this below.85 
In many cases, the precedential effect of a Supreme Court decision is 
relatively clear—the rule, as implied by the rationale necessary for the 
result, is stated unambiguously in a majority opinion, perhaps in a 
sentence that begins with the words, ―we hold that.‖ In other cases, the 
vertical stare decisis effect of a Supreme Court decision may be quite 
murky. There may be no ―opinion of the Court‖ on a particular issue, and 
the relationship between elements of the reasoning and the outcome may 
not be clear. There is another factor that clouds the doctrine of vertical 
stare decisis: the content of the doctrine is contested both at the surface 
level of detail and the deep level of theory.
86
 
In the case of NFIB, some of the vertical stare decisis effects are 
relatively clear. The Anti-Injunction Act holding, for example, would 
seem to apply to any financial exaction that Congress describes as a 
penalty and does not describe as a tax. It may be more difficult, however, 
to formulate the holding with respect to the unconstitutionality of 
conditioning ―old‖ Medicaid funding to states on the states‘ compliance 
with the expansion of Medicaid benefits and eligibility criteria. Perhaps 
the withdrawal of funding of the same magnitude (ten percent of the 
states‘ total budgets) would be subject to the same restriction under a 
variety of reasonable formulations of the holding.
87
  
 
 
 85. See discussion infra Part III.C. 
 86. See infra note 93. 
 87. See generally Bagenstos, supra note 5 (discussing effects of NFIB‘s Spending Clause 
holding); Mitchell N. Berman, Coercion, Compulsion, and the Medicaid Expansion: A Study in the 
Doctrine of Unconstitutional Conditions, 91 TEX. L. REV. 1283 (2013) (providing interpretation of the 
Medicaid expansion holding); Andrew B. Coan, Judicial Capacity and the Conditional Spending 
Paradox, 2013 WIS. L. REV. 339, available at http://wisconsinlawreview.org/wp-content/files/2-Coan-
2.pdf (arguing that the Spending Clause holding of NFIB is unstable); Eloise Pasachoff, Conditional 
Spending after NFIB v. Sebelius: The Example of Federal Education Law, 62 AM. U. L. REV. 577 
(2013) (arguing that the Spending Clause holding will have limited effects). 
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1. Vertical Stare Decisis Effects of the Opinion of the Court 
The most difficult vertical stare decisis question concerns the 
Commerce Clause and the Necessary and Proper Clause.
88
 The opinion of 
the Court contains a passage that, on the surface, asserts that the invalidity 
of the individual mandate under the Commerce Clause is part of the 
holding. The Court writes: ―The Court today holds that our Constitution 
protects us from federal regulation under the Commerce Clause so long as 
we abstain from the regulated activity.‖89 
Repetition may be important for clarity: the passage quoted above is in 
the opinion of the Court, not the separate opinion of Justice Roberts. In the 
initial wave of reaction to NFIB, this passage went mostly unnoticed.
90
 At 
a minimum, statements that use language like ―the Court today holds‖ are 
evidence of what the holding actually is.
91
 In practice, lower courts and 
brief writers frequently treat such statements as if they have enactment 
force that binds the lower courts.
92
 Let‘s call such statements, ―we-hold-
that statements.‖ 
The fact that lower courts treat we-hold-that statements as having 
enactment force does not mean that they do. Because the mandate reverses 
the Eleventh Circuit on the congressional power issue, the we-hold-that 
statement, on the surface, appears to be unnecessary to the decision: the 
result (affirmance) flows from the opinion of the Court on the basis of its 
tax power reasoning. Hence, this statement seems to be obiter dictum. 
 
 
 88. For a different analysis of the stare decisis effect of NFIB, see Gregory P. Magarian, Chief 
Justice Roberts‘ Individual Mandate: The Lawless Medicine of NFIB v. Sebelius, 108 NW. U. L. REV. 
COLLOQUY 15 (2013), http://colloquy.law.northwestern.edu/main/2013/07/chief-justice-robertss-
individual-mandate.html. 
 89. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2599 (2012). 
 90. But see Randy Barnett, Quote of the Week, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 1, 2012, 12:41 PM), 
http://www.volokh.com/2012/07/01/quote-of-the-week/; Michael E. Rosman, The Decision (with 
Apologies to Lebron James), POINTOFLAW.COM (June 28, 2012, 5:55 PM), http://www.pointoflaw 
.com/feature/archives/2012/06/the-decision-with-apologies-to-lebron-james.php; Ilya Somin, A Simple 
Solution to the Holding vs. Dictum Mess, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (July 2, 2012, 3:47 PM), http://www 
.volokh.com/2012/07/02/a-simple-solution-to-the-holding-vs-dictum-mess. 
 91. See Lawrence B. Solum, The Supreme Court in Bondage: Constitutional Stare Decisis, Legal 
Formalism, and the Future of Unenumerated Rights, 9 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 155, 188–89 (2006); cf. 
Bradley Scott Shannon, May Stare Decisis Be Abrogated by Rule?, 67 OHIO ST. L.J. 645, 685 (2006) 
(arguing that ―we hold that‖ statements are not binding without discussion of evidentiary role of such 
statements). 
 92. Cf. David Klein & Neal Devins, Dicta, Schmicta: Theory Versus Practice In Lower Court 
Decision Making, 54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 2021, 2021 (2013) (reporting results of systematic 
empirical study showing ―that lower courts hardly ever refuse to follow a statement from a higher 
court because it is dictum‖). 
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But things are more complicated than the surface of the opinion of the 
Court suggests. One complication arises from the incompletely theorized 
nature of the doctrine of vertical stare decisis. This is not the occasion for 
a full rehearsal of the current state of the law and the theoretical debates 
about the nature of stare decisis that raged in past decades.
93
 I will simply 
observe that many important questions are not clearly resolved. 
For present purposes, the important point is that the doctrine of vertical 
stare decisis is not as clear as many legal practitioners and academics may 
believe. There is, to be sure, a formalist version of the doctrine that is 
rooted in the idea of the ratio decidendi
94
: the holding of a case is the rule 
that is logically implied by the stated reasons necessary to the resolution of 
the case on the facts before the appellate court and the legal arguments 
presented by the parties. But there is another tradition of thinking about 
stare decisis that views the holding of a case as the rule that best predicts 
the future behavior of a court from the opinions expressed by the judges.
95
 
This predictive theory normally affords great weight to we-hold-that 
statements on the theory that judges themselves do not sign on to such 
statements unless they are willing to back them up in future cases. Judges 
may say other things, but many of these statements are ―cheap talk‖ 
because they do not clearly communicate a commitment to future action. 
If we return to the opinion of the Court in NFIB, the two theories seem, 
on the surface, to lead to different conclusions regarding the scope of the 
holding. If holdings are limited to the ratio decidendi, then the self-
identified ―holding‖ quoted above would be mere dicta—it was not 
necessary to the resolution of the congressional power issue. But if 
holdings are predictions, then the passage quoted could be important 
evidence that the Justices have committed themselves to the stated rule of 
law. 
 
 
 93. For general discussions of the doctrine of precedent and controversies regarding its 
formulation and justification, see RUPERT CROSS & J.W. HARRIS, PRECEDENT IN ENGLISH LAW (4th 
ed. 1991); NEIL DUXBURY, THE NATURE AND AUTHORITY OF PRECEDENT (2008); MICHAEL J. 
GERHARDT, THE POWER OF PRECEDENT (2008). On the history of stare decisis, see Charles W. Collier, 
Precedent and Legal Authority: A Critical History, 1988 WIS. L. REV. 771 (providing a partial history 
of the doctrine of precedent). 
 94. See Arthur L. Goodhart, Determining the Ratio Decidendi of a Case, 40 YALE L.J. 161 
(1930) (elaborating theory of the ratio decidendi). 
 95. See Lawrence B. Solum, Stare Decisis, Law of the Case, and Judicial Estoppel, in 18 JAMES 
WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE‘S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 134.03[4] (Matthew Bender 3d ed. 1997); see 
also Eric Talley, Precedential Cascades: An Appraisal, 73 S. CAL. L. REV. 87, 99, n.43 (1999); 
Jeremy B. Stein, Note, The Necessary Language of Exceptions: A Response to Frederick Schauer‘s 
―Exceptions,‖ 63 N.Y.U. ANN. SURV. AM. L. 99, 114 (2007). 
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Even under the predictive theory of holdings, the quoted passage may 
be outweighed by other evidence predictive of future behavior by the 
Justices who joined Part III-C. The quoted passage is isolated within Part 
III-C, which does not provide reasoning that would support the holding. 
That reasoning is provided in Part III-A, but that part is the opinion of 
Justice Roberts alone. Extrinsic evidence suggests that the four Justices 
who joined Roberts in Part III-C do not view themselves as committed on 
the Commerce Clause issue: Justice Ginsburg, joined by Justices Breyer, 
Sotomayor, and Kagan, explicitly and forcefully expressed their 
disagreement with Justice Roberts‘s Commerce Clause reasoning. Of 
course, four other Justices (Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito) authored 
the joint dissent that agrees in spirit with Part III-A. But they pointedly did 
not join Part III-A. 
These complexities are likely to lead to speculation. For example, it is 
possible that the quoted passage was written on the assumption that 
Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito would join Part III-A of Justice 
Roberts‘s opinion. If they had, that portion of the opinion would have been 
denominated an ―opinion of the Court.‖ But they did not join Part III-A. 
One might speculate that the quoted passage was left in the opinion by 
accident, or that Justices Ginsburg, Breyer, Sotomayor, and Kagan 
knowingly agreed to this passage—as part of a compromise reached with 
Justice Roberts. Of course, either of these scenarios would be odd. A 
compromise is unlikely given that the four Justices who joined the 
purported holding statement also joined a dissent on the very same point. 
A mistake is unlikely because Supreme Court Justices and their clerks 
surely know that we-hold-that statements are important. In any event, odd 
things do happen. 
Some might think that the extrinsic evidence deprives the quoted 
passage of evidentiary value, and hence that it cannot serve as the basis of 
a prediction. That argument would be decisive if Justices Kennedy, Scalia, 
Thomas, and Alito substantially disagreed with the reasoning of Part III-A 
of Justice Roberts‘s opinion, but they do not. What they do say suggests 
that, functionally and substantively, they are mostly on board with Part 
III-A. From the perspective of the predictive theory, the extrinsic evidence 
actually supports the claim that the passage in the opinion of the Court 
predicts the future behavior of the Justices. 
The view that we-hold-that statements are particularly important in 
making predictions is a view about their evidentiary function. If there is 
contradictory evidence (and there is), the balance of evidence should 
control: we can call this idea, the ―balance of evidence standard.‖ The 
balance-of-evidence standard leads to another evidentiary heuristic for the 
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predictive theory—the so-called ―rule of five.‖96 If you can count five 
votes for a position, that position has predictive value. Of course, the 
quality of the evidence counts. One might attempt to predict the future 
behavior of the Court based on the general ideological characteristics of 
the individual justices. From the point of view of the predictive theory, 
that kind of evidence is likely to be unsatisfactory because this sort of 
prediction does not produce the level of confidence required by the 
predictive theory of precedent. Lower federal courts are not entitled to 
disregard Supreme Court holdings on the basis of educated guesses about 
the future behavior of the Supreme Court—the Court itself has said that.97 
The predictive theory of precedent requires that the predictions flow from 
strong evidence found within Supreme Court decisions. So the holding of 
a case is a prediction made from evidence that is internal to the opinions of 
the Justices. 
2. Vertical Stare Decisis Effects of All the Opinions Under the 
Narrowest Grounds Rule 
Once we have all the opinions in view, we need to consider the 
possible effects of the narrowest grounds rule.
98
 The content of that rule is 
unclear,
99
 but we can tease out some of the implications without a precise 
version of the rule. We are going to begin with the formalist version—the 
narrowest grounds rule as it would be formulated within the general 
approach of the ratio decidendi theory of precedent. The rule was stated in 
Marks v. United States as follows: ―[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a 
case and no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the assent of five 
Justices, ‗the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.‘‖100 The Ninth Circuit suggested that Marks requires the lower 
 
 
 96. On the ―rule of five,‖ see Richard J. Lazarus, Counting Votes and Discounting Holdings in 
the Supreme Court‘s Takings Cases, 38 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1099, 1102 (1997); Mark V. Tushnet, 
Themes in Warren Court Biographies, 70 N.Y.U. L. REV. 748, 763 (1995). 
 97. See de Quijas v. Shearson/Am. Express, Inc., 490 U.S. 477, 484 (1989) (―If a precedent of 
this Court has direct application in a case, yet appears to rest on reasons rejected in some other line of 
decisions, the Court of Appeals should follow the case which directly controls, leaving to this Court 
the prerogative of overruling its own decisions.‖). 
 98. See Linda Novak, Note, The Precedential Value of Supreme Court Plurality Decisions, 80 
COLUM. L. REV. 756, 760–61 (1980) (discussing narrowest grounds rule); see also Marks v. United 
States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977). 
 99. E.g., Nichols v. United States, 511 U.S. 738, 745–46 (1994) (stating, ―[I]t [is] not useful to 
pursue the Marks inquiry to the utmost logical possibility when it has so obviously baffled and divided 
the lower courts that have considered it.‖). 
 100. Marks, 430 U.S. at 193 (citation omitted). 
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federal courts to find the ―legal standard which, when applied, will 
necessarily produce results with which a majority of the Court from that 
case would agree.‖101 If there is no such opinion, ―the only binding aspect 
of a splintered decision is its specific result.‖102 
What are the criteria for ―narrowest‖? Michael Abramowicz and 
Maxwell Stearns suggest that narrowness is defined relevant to the effect 
produced:  
[w]hen the Court strikes down a law on constitutional grounds, the 
rule seeks the opinion consistent with the outcome that would strike 
down the fewest laws. Conversely, when the Court sustains a law 
against a constitutional challenge, the narrowest grounds opinion is 
that opinion consistent with the outcome that would sustain the 
fewest laws.
103
 
How does the narrowest grounds rule apply to NFIB? Consider first the 
implications of Part III-D of Justice Roberts‘s opinion: 
 Justice GINSBURG questions the necessity of rejecting the 
Government‘s commerce power argument, given that § 5000A can 
be upheld under the taxing power. But the statute reads more 
naturally as a command to buy insurance than as a tax, and I would 
uphold it as a command if the Constitution allowed it. It is only 
because the Commerce Clause does not authorize such a command 
that it is necessary to reach the taxing power question. And it is only 
because we have a duty to construe a statute to save it, if fairly 
possible, that § 5000A can be interpreted as a tax. Without deciding 
the Commerce Clause question, I would find no basis to adopt such 
a saving construction. 
 The Federal Government does not have the power to order 
people to buy health insurance. Section 5000A would therefore be 
unconstitutional if read as a command.
104
 
 
 
 101. United States v. Williams, 435 F.3d 1148, 1157 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Planned Parenthood 
v. Casey, 947 F.2d 683, 693 (3d Cir. 1991), aff‘d in part and rev‘d in part on other grounds, 505 U.S. 
833 (1992)). 
 102. United States v. Rodriguez-Preciado, 399 F.3d 1118, 1140 (9th Cir.) (quoting Anker Energy 
Corp. v. Consolidation Coal Co., 177 F.3d 161, 170 (3d Cir. 1999)), amended by 416 F.3d 939 (9th 
Cir. 2005). 
 103. Michael Abramowicz & Maxwell L. Stearns, Beyond Counting Votes: The Political Economy 
of Bush v. Gore, 54 VAND. L. REV. 1849, 1912 (2001).  
 104. NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2600–01 (2012) (citations omitted). 
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The ground articulated by Chief Justice Roberts would be narrowest, in 
that it would only sustain laws that were taxes or that could reasonably be 
construed as taxes, and it would not sustain laws that could only be upheld 
under the Commerce Clause. The rationale in Justice Ginsburg‘s opinion 
would be broader because it would sustain laws of both types. 
Even if Justice Roberts‘s rationale is narrowest, is it necessary? One 
might argue that even given the ratio decidendi theory of the doctrine of 
vertical stare decisis, the Commerce Clause reasoning is in fact necessary 
to the validation of congressional power to enact the penalty provisions of 
the ACA. How would that argument go? It might begin with the 
observation that the reasoning concerning the Commerce Clause in Part 
III-A and Part III-D of Justice Roberts‘s opinion is necessary to the chain 
of reasoning that produced the outcome, because absent the Commerce 
Clause reasoning, Roberts would not have even reached the tax power 
issue. 
This reasoning might be challenged by arguing that Justice Roberts 
would not have reached the Commerce Clause issue if he had used the 
modern version of the avoidance canon. Mark Tushnet made precisely this 
argument shortly after the decision in NFIB was made: 
 There is a ―canon‖ of statutory construction known as the 
―constitutional avoidance‖ canon. It comes in two versions, now 
labeled the ―classical‖ version and the ―modern‖ one. On the 
modern version, a judge faced with a statute that, most naturally 
read, raises difficult constitutional questions, should adopt instead a 
construction—if one is fairly available—that does not raise such 
questions. On the modern version, then, the Chief Justice didn't 
have to address the Commerce Clause question; all he needed to do 
was to note that the question was difficult and that construing the 
statute to impose a tax was an available reading.
105
 
Tushnet‘s conclusion is that Chief Justice Roberts‘s Commerce Clause 
reasoning was unnecessary, but his argument for that conclusion is not 
fully developed. A fuller analysis requires a more precise formulation of 
what we can call the ―necessity component‖ of the narrowest grounds rule. 
 
 
 105. Mark Tushnet, Did the Chief Justice Have to Decide the Commerce Clause Question in 
NFIB?, BALKINIZATION (July 3, 2012, 8:45 PM), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2012/07/did-chief-justice-
have-to-decide.html; see also Joel Alicea, The Healthcare Ruling‘s Stare Decisis Conundrum—Part 1, 
SCOTUSREPORT (July 2, 2012, 8:30 AM), http://www.scotusreport.com/2012/07/02/the-healthcare-
rulings-stare-decisis-conundrum-part-1/; Joel Alicea, The Two Versions of the Avoidance Canon, 
SCOTUSREPORT (July 5, 2012, 9:52 AM), http://www.scotusreport.com/2012/07/05/the-two-versions 
-of-the-avoidance-canon/. Greg Magarian makes a similar argument. See Magarian, supra note 88. 
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This need arises because of the distinction between (1) reasons that are 
necessary to the result and (2) reasons that are necessary elements of a set 
of actually articulated reasons that are jointly sufficient to support the 
result. 
This distinction may sound technical, but it is crucially important. Few 
reasons are absolutely necessary to a decision; in many cases the outcome 
could have been reached on the basis of many different reasons—and 
hence no single reason is necessary.  
The alternative conception of necessity focuses on the actually 
articulated reasons and asks which of these are necessary members of a set 
of reasons that are jointly sufficient to justify the outcome. The alternative 
conception captures the ordinary lawyer‘s distinction between holding and 
obiter dictum. Of all the reasons presented, only those that are required to 
produce the outcome are eligible as ―holdings‖; reasons that are could be 
eliminated without changing the result are ―dicta.‖ 
These two distinct conceptions of what ―necessary‖ means can be 
translated into two formulations of the necessity component of the 
narrowest grounds rule. 
For the purposes of the narrowest grounds rule, a reason is deemed 
―necessary to the outcome‖ if and only if: 
Formulation One: The outcome could not have been reached absent 
the reason. 
Formulation Two: The reason is actually articulated in one of the 
opinions, and the reason forms a necessary element of a set of 
reasons that are jointly sufficient to produce the result. 
If holdings are limited by Formulation One, then the set of holdings 
will be very small indeed. For any given case, there will be a set of 
possible chains of reasoning, each of which would be sufficient to justify 
the outcome actually reached. If the fact that a given reason is not included 
in every possible outcome-justifying chain of reason entailed the 
conclusion that the reason was not ―necessary‖ and hence not eligible for 
inclusion in the holding of the case, then many (and perhaps most or even 
all) cases would not have holdings at all, an obviously absurd 
consequence. The point of the reductio ad abdurdum is to show that the 
Formulation One of the necessity criterion for status as a holding cannot 
be correct. 
For the ratio decidendi theory to be plausible, it must focus on the 
reasons actually provided; the theoretical availability of a reason not 
actually articulated in opinions of the judges in the case does negate the 
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necessity of a premise in the chain or reasons that are actually offered. 
Formulation Two is also consistent with an actual statement of the Marks 
rule: ―the holding of the Court may be viewed as that position taken by 
those Members who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest 
grounds.‖106 It is the ―position taken‖ and not ―the narrowest position that 
could have been taken‖ that provides the holding. When more than one 
chain of reasoning is actually offered and sufficient to support the result, 
the result is alternative holdings. Formulation Two takes these 
complexities into account. 
In light of these points about necessity, consider again the argument 
that the Commerce Clause reasoning in Justice Roberts‘s opinion is dicta 
because he could have relied on the modern version of the avoidance 
canon.
107
 This argument works perfectly on Formulation One. Justice 
Roberts could have reasoned differently, by relying on the modern 
formulation of the avoidance canon, and therefore, this discussion of the 
Commerce Clause is dicta. But Formulation One suggests an even simpler 
basis for the argument that the interstate commerce reasoning is dicta. 
Justice Roberts could simply have accepted the tax power argument 
endorsed by Justice Ginsburg; if he had done that, he would not even have 
had to mention the Commerce Clause. By the same reasoning, the tax 
power discussion is also unnecessary, since Roberts could have decided 
the case on the basis of the Commerce Clause. Formulation One is very 
stringent indeed, and if we accept it, then it is not clear that there is any 
holding on the federal power issue in NFIB. 
Formulation Two, on the other hand, suggests a more precise version 
of the argument that Roberts‘s Commerce Clause reasoning was 
necessary. The Commerce Clause reasoning in Part III-A and Part III-D of 
Justice Roberts‘s opinion is a necessary element in a chain of reasoning 
that was articulated and is itself sufficient to support the result. It is a 
necessary element because the chain of reasoning actually offered by 
Justice Roberts depends on it. That chain of reasoning (contained in Parts 
III-A, III-B & III-C) is sufficient to produce the outcome on the question 
of whether Congress had power to enact the ACA. Hence the Commerce 
Clause reasoning satisfies the standard set in Formulation Two. 
There is another basis for the contention that the Commerce Clause 
reasoning in Parts III-A and III-D in Justice Roberts‘s opinion was 
necessary to the result in NFIB. What was the result? One way to 
 
 
 106. Marks v. United States, 430 U.S. 188, 193 (1977) (quoting Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 
169 n.15 (1976)). 
 107. See supra text accompanying notes 103–04. 
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characterize the result is that the Court upheld the individual mandate, but 
that characterization is only approximately correct. We can be more 
precise. What the Court actually did was to uphold the penalty provisions 
that enforced the individual mandate. It did this by adopting a saving 
construction of Section 5000A that negates the command (the mandate to 
purchase insurance) by construing the penalty as a tax (which does not 
create a legal obligation to purchase insurance). That there is a difference 
between the two is absolutely clear from the following two hypotheticals: 
Hypothetical One: Suppose that Congress had enacted a statute that 
explicitly stated that the penalty provisions were valid only if they 
enforced a legal obligation to purchase insurance. 
Had Section 5000A been written this way, it would have been struck down 
because the saving construction would have been unavailable. Now 
consider the second hypothetical: 
Hypothetical Two: Suppose that Justice Roberts had concluded that 
the Commerce Clause did support the individual mandate as a legal 
obligation. 
In that case, he would not have adopted the saving construction of Section 
5000A and would instead have concluded that a legal obligation to 
purchase insurance (enforceable by a financial penalty or, hypothetically, 
by imprisonment) was within the scope of congressional power. The 
juxtaposition of the two hypotheticals makes it clear that the Commerce 
Clause reasoning was required to reach the precise result reached in NFIB. 
But there is a counter-argument. One might argue that the difference 
between a saving construction that upholds the penalty as a tax but negates 
the legal obligation is merely formal because the saving construction is 
functionally equivalent to the result of a decision that upheld the legal 
obligation and the tax under the Commerce Clause. This argument can be 
elaborated via the ―bad man‖ theory articulated by Justice Holmes.108 
From the perspective of the bad man, the only thing that matters is the 
penalty. The bad man does not care about obligations; he cares about 
consequences. 
Of course, this move does not end the argument. The bad man theory 
of the nature of law is controversial, to say the least.
109
 Alternative views 
 
 
 108. See Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 991, 993 (1997). 
 109. See generally David J. Seipp, Holmes‘s Path, 77 B.U. L. REV. 515, 552–58 (1997) 
(discussing reception of bad man theory); Henry M. Hart, Jr., Comment, Holmes‘ Positivism—An 
Addendum, 64 HARV. L. REV. 929, 932 (1951) (criticizing bad man theory). 
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of the nature of law contend that legal obligations can have motivational 
force that is independent of legally prescribed rewards and punishments. 
These are deep waters, and the debates concerning the nature of law and 
their relationship to the bad man theory cannot be resolved in this essay. 
This much is clear: to the extent that the argument against viewing the 
Commerce Clause reasoning as part of the holding rests on the correctness 
of some version of the bad man theory, it cannot command consensus 
support among legal theorists or judges. 
Even if one accepts the bad man theory, there is a strong argument that 
Justice Roberts‘s saving construction would (at least in some 
circumstances) make a difference to someone motivated only by rewards 
and punishments. Consider the following hypothetical: 
Hypothetical Three: Suppose that Congress amends the ACA, 
eliminating the financial penalty enforced by the Internal Revenue 
Service and substituting a criminal penalty enforced by the 
Department of Justice. The criminal penalty is then challenged in a 
district court, and the plaintiff argues that NFIB is controlling and 
that the criminal penalty is invalid. 
Given this hypothetical, the bad man argument would no longer be 
available as the basis for the contention that there is no difference between 
Justice Roberts‘s saving construction and a decision that plainly upheld 
the mandate itself (and not just the penalty). The narrowest grounds rule 
would then come into play,
110
 and Justice Roberts‘s reasoning that the tax 
power holding depends on the Commerce Clause holding, in conjunction 
with the joint dissent of Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito, 
would then operate with the doctrine of vertical stare decisis to bind the 
district court. Hypothetical Three strongly suggests that NFIB should be 
given vertical stare decisis effect, albeit an effect that is limited to 
relevantly similar mandates enforced by criminal penalties (or fines that 
are unambiguously not taxes). This idea might be expressed as follows: 
Justice Roberts‘s opinion does not uphold the ―individual mandate‖ (the 
requirement to purchase insurance); instead, it upholds the penalty, not as 
an enforcement provision, but instead and soley as a tax. 
There is yet another reason to reject the bad man argument. Ultimately, 
the bad man is interested in predictions about what the Court will do. As 
we have already seen, if one adopts a strongly realist understanding of the 
 
 
 110. See Novak, supra note 98 at 760–61; Marks, 430 U.S. at 193; see also supra text 
accompanying note 98. 
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doctrine of stare decisis, then the formalities do not matter at all. If 
holdings are just our best predictions of what courts will do, then we 
determine the holdings of the United States Supreme Court by the rule of 
five: the holding of a case is determined by counting votes. On that 
strongly realist conception, the key fact about NFIB would be that five 
members of the Court endorsed an understanding of the Commerce Clause 
that would invalidate the individual mandate, to the extent that its validity 
depends on that clause. 
Recall that the role of the bad man theory in our present discussion is to 
undermine the argument that there is a difference between Justice 
Roberts‘s saving construction of the individual mandate and an alternative 
outcome in which the individual mandate was upheld without a saving 
construction. The realist theoretical underpinnings of the bad man theory 
undermine the realist argument that the Commerce Clause reasoning is 
unnecessary to the decision because legal obligations collapse into the 
rewards and punishments that enforce them. The application of the rule of 
five to Hypothetical Three makes this clear: given the current composition 
of the Court, the best prediction is that the Court would strike down an 
attempt by Congress to attach direct criminal penalties to the ACA. 
Moreover, from the perspective of a realist, we might ask what the 
lower courts are actually likely to do with Commerce Clause arguments 
that cite Part III-B of Justice Roberts‘s opinion and the joint dissent by 
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito. Given the highly convoluted 
nature of the theoretical arguments and the uncertain state of stare decisis 
doctrine, one might believe that different lower court judges are likely to 
reach different results on the stare decisis question, depending on their 
view of the merits of the Commerce Clause issue or even their view of the 
desirability of the statutory provision that is the subject of a Commerce 
Clause challenge. That is, from the realist perspective, one effect of NFIB 
is to enable litigators to cite the opinion of Justice Roberts and the joint 
dissent of Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito as binding 
authority (and in the alternative as persuasive authority
111
). Of course, 
judges who disagree with these five Justices may reject the argument that 
the authority is binding and find the arguments unpersuasive. Likewise, 
judges who agree with Roberts and the authors of the joint dissent may 
accept the argument that NFIB is binding on the Commerce Clause issue 
and also find the reasoning persuasive. This fact will become important 
when we consider the indirect effects of NFIB. From the realist 
 
 
 111. The persuasive effect of the opinions in NFIB is explored below. See infra Part IV.B. 
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perspective, the Commerce Clause reasoning of these five Justices creates 
an opening for constitutional contestation. 
Have the lower courts treated NFIB as binding authority on the 
Commerce Clause issue? It is too early to draw conclusions from the 
handful of reported decisions. In United States v. Henry,
112
 the Ninth 
Circuit noted the existence of a controversy concerning the question of 
whether the Commerce Clause reasoning in NFIB was holding or dicta.
113
 
In United States v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, the same circuit rejected a 
challenge to the Sex Offender Registration and Notification Act based on 
the theory that it constituted an ―individual mandate,‖ but did not 
comment on the status of the commerce clause discussion in Sebelius.
114
 In 
United States v. Rose, the Sixth Circuit treated the commerce clause 
discussion in NFIB as a holding, stating ―The Court determined that the 
mandate ‗cannot be sustained‘ under Congress‘s Commerce Clause power 
because it forces into commerce individuals who have elected to refrain 
from such commercial activity, which goes beyond Congress‘s Commerce 
Clause powers.‖115 In United States v. Robbins, the Second Circuit 
assumed (arguendo) that the the activity-inactivity distinction from NFIB 
was controlling but found that the challenged statute did regulate 
―activity‖ and hence was within Congress‘s Commerce Clause power.116 
Further, a number of district court opinions seem to assume that Justice 
Roberts‘s Commerce Clause reasoning in NFIB does provide a holding. In 
United States v. Moore,
117
 the Eastern District of Washington issued an 
opinion that was far from clear, but on its surface the opinion seems to 
read NFIB as creating a rule placing regulation of ―compelled‖ activity 
outside the Commerce Clause.
118
 The District of South Carolina in 
McElveen v. Mike Reichenbach Ford Lincoln, Inc.
119
 characterized NFIB 
as holding that ―because the Commerce Clause permits power over 
‗activity,‘ it does not support the individual mandate in the Affordable 
Care Act because it would permit Congress to regulate inactivity rather 
 
 
 112. 688 F.3d 637 (9th Cir. 2012). 
 113. Id. at 641–42 n.5; see also United States v. Roszkowski, 700 F.3d 50, 58 n.3 (1st Cir. 2012) 
(citing United States v. Henry and declining to opine of precedential status of Commerce Clause 
discussion in NFIB). 
 114. U.S. v. Cabrera-Gutierrez, 718 F.3d 873, 2013 WL 2378574 (9th Cir. 2013). 
 115. 714 F.3d 362, 371 (6th Cir. 2013). 
 116. 729 F.3d 131, 135–36 (2d Cir. 2013). 
 117. No. CR-12-6023-RMP, 2012 WL 3780343 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 31, 2012). 
 118. Id. at *2. 
 119. C/A No. 4:12-874-RBH-KDW, 2012 WL 3964973 (D.S.C. Aug. 22, 2012). 
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than existing commercial activity.‖120 In United States v. Williams,121 the 
Southern District of Florida stated ―the Court [in NFIB] found Congress‘s 
attempt to require everyone to buy health insurance exceeded its power 
under the commerce clause . . . .‖122 A recent decision by the Western 
District of Pennsylvania reviewed several lower-court decisions discussing 
the status of the commerce-clause discussion in NFIB and concluded that 
the Court held that the ―Commerce Clause permits Congress to regulate 
intrastate activities that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce, 
but may not do so by compelling those activities.‖123 
In addition, some commentators have assumed that the Commerce 
Clause reasoning constitutes a holding; for example, Pamela Karlan wrote, 
―in NFIB, a five-Justice majority took an exit ramp, holding that the 
Affordable Care Act‘s minimum coverage provision—§ 5000A, which 
requires that a large proportion of Americans carry health insurance—
exceeded Congress‘s power under the Commerce Clause.‖124 
Our analysis so far suggests that the Commerce Clause reasoning in 
Justice Roberts‘s opinion is part of the holding in NFIB—on either a 
realist or formalist understanding of the doctrine of vertical stare decisis. 
But even if the analysis is not correct, it may nonetheless be the case that 
many lower courts will believe that they are bound by the Commerce 
Clause reasoning, as suggested by many of the federal district court cases 
decided to date. None of these opinions actually invalidated a federal 
statute, and district court opinions do not have stare decisis force in any 
event. However, the reported cases provide evidence that the lower federal 
courts take the Commerce Clause reasoning in Justice Roberts‘s opinion 
seriously—as either a holding or as functionally the equivalent of a 
holding. This analysis is confirmed by Bradley Joondeph, who writes, ―the 
five justices‘ conclusion that the individual mandate exceeds Congress‘s 
commerce power seems quite likely to operate as a holding in practice.‖125 
 
 
 120. Id. at *3. 
 121. No. 12-60116-CR-RNS, 2012 WL 3242043 (S.D. Fla. Aug. 7, 2012). 
 122. Id. at *3. 
 123. United States v. Stacey, Slip Copy, 2013 WL 1891342, at *3 (W.D.Pa. May 6, 2013). 
 124. Pamela S. Karlan, The Supreme Court 2011 Term—Foreword: Democracy and Disdain, 126 
HARV. L. REV. 1, 43–44 (2012) (footnotes omitted); see also Joseph Fishkin, The Dignity of the South, 
123 YALE L.J. ONLINE 175, 188 n.54 (2013) (noting ―Commerce Clause holding‖ in NFIB); Elizabeth 
Weeks Leonard et al., Employers United: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Political Speech in the 
Wake of The Affordable Care Act, 38 J. CORP. L., Winter 2013, at 217, 253 (characterizing NFIB as 
―holding‖ that ―that the ACA‘s minimum essential coverage requirement is unconstitutional under the 
Commerce Clause . . . .‖); David L. Sloss, Kiobel and Extraterritoriality: A Rule Without a Rationale, 
28 MD. J. INT‘L L. 241, 253 n.75 (2013) (―In Sebelius, the Court created a new, unprecedented 
constitutional limitation on Congress‘ Commerce Power.‖). 
 125. Bradley W. Joondeph, The Affordable Care Act and the Commerce Power: Much Ado About 
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Even so, it is not clear that the doctrine of vertical stare decisis will 
make a practical difference to the outcome of future Commerce Clause 
litigation. Whatever the Commerce Clause holding of NFIB is, it is 
narrow, applying only to individual mandates or regulations predicated on 
forced participation in economic activity. Indeed, part of the litigation 
strategy of the plaintiffs in NFIB was to argue that the individual mandate 
was unprecedented—precisely in order to avoid the impression that a 
decision invalidating the mandate would require the wholesale reversal of 
New Deal precedent expanding the scope of Congress‘s power under the 
Commerce Clause. 
But suppose that a lower federal court did, properly or plausibly, rely 
on NFIB to strike down a statute that could not be upheld as a tax—in a 
case like that in Hypothetical Three, in which a statute is enforced by an 
explicitly criminal penalty of imprisonment. The Supreme Court is almost 
certain to grant certiorari in such a case, and once the case is in the 
Supreme Court, the doctrine of vertical stare decisis no longer applies. 
Instead, the issue becomes one of horizontal stare decisis. 
C. Horizontal Stare Decisis 
A third form of direct legal effect for Supreme Court decisions is 
horizontal stare decisis. Some courts afford binding effect to their own 
prior decisions. For example, several of the circuits of the United States 
Court of Appeals follow a rule that requires three-judge panels to follow 
circuit law but allows the en banc court (or en banc panels of the court) to 
overrule a prior decision of the circuit.
126
 The United States Supreme 
Court does not consider itself bound by its own prior decisions but does 
take the position that they have legal force. 
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,
127
 the 
Court described its practice as follows: 
[I]t is common wisdom that the rule of stare decisis is not an 
―inexorable command,‖ and certainly it is not such in every 
constitutional case. Rather, when this Court reexamines a prior 
holding, its judgment is customarily informed by a series of 
prudential and pragmatic considerations designed to test the 
consistency of overruling a prior decision with the ideal of the rule 
 
 
(Nearly) Nothing, 6 J. HEALTH & LIFE SCI. L., Feb. 2013, at 1, 23. 
 126. See, e.g., Miller v. Gammie, 335 F.3d 889, 899–900 (9th Cir. 2003) (en banc) (stating that an 
en banc court may overrule a panel decision). 
 127. 505 U.S. 833 (1992). 
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of law, and to gauge the respective costs of reaffirming and 
overruling a prior case. Thus, for example, we may ask whether the 
rule has proven to be intolerable simply in defying practical 
workability; whether the rule is subject to a kind of reliance that 
would lend a special hardship to the consequences of overruling and 
add inequity to the cost of repudiation; whether related principles of 
law have so far developed as to have left the old rule no more than a 
remnant of abandoned doctrine; or whether facts have so changed, 
or come to be seen so differently, as to have robbed the old rule of 
significant application or justification.
128
 
Given this extraordinarily flexible standard, it seems unlikely that 
NFIB would stand in the way of a Supreme Court majority with strongly 
held views of the merits. But this does not entail that the holdings in NFIB 
could not play an important role. The conventions that govern briefing and 
argument in the Supreme Court make it likely that holdings and disputes 
over holdings would play a substantial role in shaping the presentation of 
the case. And it is certainly possible that a given Justice who was 
persuaded that an issue was decided in NFIB would consider that fact to be 
important and perhaps decisive, if the Justice would otherwise have been 
on the fence. 
The possible role of NFIB in the Supreme Court can be illustrated by 
additional hypotheticals involving three possible worlds in which the 
Supreme Court has different members with different reactions to briefs 
that cite NFIB. The three hypotheticals can be stated as follows, with 
―liberal‖ and ―conservative‖ used as proxies for expansive and restrictive 
understandings of the Commerce Clause, respectively. 
Hypothetical Four: Suppose that one of the Justices who joined the 
joint dissent resigns and is replaced by a liberal Justice. A case 
comes before the Court in which the party challenging the 
legislation argues that the outcome is controlled by the reasoning of 
Justice Roberts‘s opinion on the Commerce Clause issue. The five 
liberal Justices reject this argument and reason that even if NFIB 
had precedential value, it should not control under the Casey 
standard. 
Hypothetical Five: Suppose that one of the Justices who joined 
Justice Ginsburg‘s opinion resigns and is replaced by a conservative 
Justice. A case comes before the Court, and the government argues 
 
 
 128. Id. at 854–55 (citations omitted). 
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that Justice Roberts‘s opinion on the Commerce Clause issue is 
obiter dictum and that Justice Ginsburg‘s opinion correctly states 
the law. The six conservative Justices reject the government‘s 
argument and reason that NFIB has precedential value under the 
narrowest grounds rule and that under the Casey standard, the NFIB 
holdings on the Commerce Clause and Necessary and Proper Clause 
should control. 
Hypothetical Six: Suppose that one of the Justices who joined the 
joint dissent resigns and is replaced by a moderately conservative 
Justice. A case comes before the Court in which the party 
challenging the legislation argues that the outcome is controlled by 
the reasoning of Justice Roberts‘s opinion on the Commerce Clause 
issue. The new Justice is on the fence about the merits of the 
Commerce Clause claim but is convinced that NFIB has 
precedential force, and this tips the balance against the government 
and for the plaintiff. 
All three hypotheticals are plausible. Of course, partisans of an 
expansive Commerce Clause are likely to believe that the reasoning in 
Hypothetical Four is correct, and the reasoning in Hypotheticals Five and 
Six is incorrect—and vice versa for partisans of a restrictive reading of the 
Clause. The most important ―take away‖ point is that the doctrine of 
horizontal stare decisis in Casey, when juxtaposed with the opinions in 
NFIB, creates the space for constitutional contestation of Commerce 
Clause doctrine in the Supreme Court. 
* * * 
NFIB clearly has already had important direct legal effects on the 
validity and implementation of the ACA. And NFIB may have some 
important vertical stare decisis effects with respect to the Anti-Injunction 
Act and conditional spending issues. A strong case can be made that the 
Commerce Clause reasoning in Justice Roberts‘s opinion should have 
vertical stare decisis effect in a narrow range of possible future cases, but 
it is less clear that its vertical stare decisis effects will have practical 
importance for future Commerce Clause disputes. In the long run, the 
Commerce Clause implications of NFIB will be decided in the Supreme 
Court, and the fragmented opinions in NFIB are not likely to be decisive. 
But not all legal effects are direct. The most important legal consequences 
of NFIB may be its indirect legal effects. 
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IV. INDIRECT LEGAL EFFECTS: A CONSTITUTIONAL GESTALT SHIFT 
Supreme Court opinions have indirect effects on constitutional 
practice. These indirect effects can be mediated in a variety of ways. A 
Supreme Court decision may trigger a constitutional backlash that 
mobilizes popular opinion against the result in the case. Or the decision 
might play a role in changing social norms, with a subsequent feedback 
loop into future judicial decisions. In this Article, we will focus on a 
particular kind of indirect legal effect—which we will call a 
―constitutional gestalt shift.‖ 
A. Constitutional Contestation as a Complex Argumentative Practice 
The indirect consequences of Supreme Court decisions is illuminated 
by the idea that, as a descriptive matter, constitutional adjudication and 
decision is constituted in part by a complex argumentative practice.
129
 That 
practice is governed by a set of norms. Some of those norms are like 
rules—they are relatively hard and fast with bright lines and hard edges. 
You cannot argue to a district court that it should overrule a recent 
decision of the United States Supreme Court—the move is ―off the wall‖, 
out of bounds, and beyond the pale. Some of the norms can be 
reconstructed as standards—soft and loose, vague and ambiguous. You 
can argue, in some circumstances, that the Supreme Court should overrule 
one of its prior decisions, but it is difficult to know in advance when this 
move will be encouraged and when the Court will shut it down. At any 
given time, some Supreme Court decisions are canonical—any doctrinal 
theory must count such decisions as correctly decided. Other decisions are 
anticanonical—they are paradigm cases of error.130 You might be able to 
argue today that District of Columbia v. Heller
131
 or Wickard v. Filburn
132
 
 
 
 129. For implicit and explicit developments of the idea of law as a complex argumentative 
practice, see PHILIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982); 
Mitchell N. Berman, Constitutional Theory and the Rule of Recognition: Toward a Fourth Theory of 
Law, in THE RULE OF RECOGNITION AND THE U.S. CONSTITUTION 269 (Matthew D. Adler & Kenneth 
E. Himma eds., 2009); see also Lawrence B. Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, in ROBERT W. 
BENNETT & LAWRENCE B. SOLUM, CONSTITUTONAL ORIGINALISM: A DEBATE 1, 76 (2011) 
(discussing constitutional law as a complex argumentative practice). The general idea that law is a 
complex argumentative practice is developed by Dennis Patterson. See DENNIS PATTERSON, LAW AND 
TRUTH 128–50 (1996). 
 130. See generally Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. REV. 379 (2011) (discussing the 
idea of anticanonical cases). 
 131. 554 U.S. 570 (2008). 
 132. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
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was wrongly decided, but not Brown v. Board of Education
133
 or Marbury 
v. Madison.
134
 You cannot argue that Lochner v. New York
135
 was decided 
correctly. The norms that govern the complex practice of constitutional 
argument are dynamic, changing over time in response to both politics and 
developments within the practice itself. 
B. Persuasive Authority 
Before we turn to the idea of a constitutional gestalt, we should note 
the existence of another particular kind of move in the complex 
argumentative practice that structures constitutional contestation. The 
concept of persuasive authority is not well theorized, but the intuitive idea 
is clear. Dicta in cases and the reasoning of nonauthoritative sources may 
persuade judges to adopt legal rules, but the force of persuasive authority 
is nonbinding. Persuasive authority has four distinct but related 
components: (1) persuasion by reasons, (2) persuasion by epistemic 
authority, (3) persuasion by predictive authority, and (4) persuasion by 
legitimating authority. Consider each of the four components. 
First, persuasion by the independent force of reasons is independent of 
the person or institution that provides the reasons: in this regard, the 
reasons of Supreme Court Justices are, in principle, capable of being no 
more persuasive than the same reasons when provided by a student law 
review note. Each of the nonbinding opinion segments in NFIB can be a 
source of persuasion by reasons. 
Second, consider persuasion by epistemic authority. Of course, most of 
us are inclined to regard what is written by a Supreme Court Justice or 
eminent academic authority as more persuasive than what is written in 
student notes, even though it is the case that the latter are sometimes 
correct when they disagree with either of the former. In part, this is 
because we regard some persons or institutions as epistemic authorities. 
The idea of epistemic authority is related to a general approach to 
knowledge known as social epistemology (or ―epistemics‖) that is strongly 
associated with the philosopher Alvin Goldman.
136
 Whereas individual 
epistemology (or ―epistemology‖) ―identif[ies] and evaluate[s] 
psychological processes that occur within the epistemic subject,‖ the 
related inquiry of social epistemology aims to ―identify and evaluate social 
 
 
 133. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). 
 134. 5 U.S. 137 (1803). 
 135. 198 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 136. See generally ALVIN I. GOLDMAN, KNOWLEDGE IN A SOCIAL WORLD (1999). 
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processes by which epistemic subjects interact with other agents who exert 
causal influence on their beliefs.‖137 In the sense I am using the term, an 
―epistemic authority‖ is some person or institution to whom or which 
others defer because of the authority‘s expertise.138 
The opinions of Supreme Court Justices may be viewed as epistemic 
authorities because of the belief in the legal expertise of the Justices. The 
relationship that creates epistemic authority might be viewed as dyadic—a 
relationship between a pair consisting of the possibile epistemic authority 
and the individual who might defer to the epistemic authority. A given 
lower court judge, say Learned Hand, might not view a given Supreme 
Court Justice, say Tom Clark, as an epistemic authority or even as an 
epistemic peer or equal. But many judges, lawyers, and scholars are likely 
to view Supreme Court Justices as epistemic authorities, at least on some 
topics. 
Third, opinions of the Justices may persuade because of their predictive 
value. We have already examined the realist or predictive view of vertical 
stare decisis above. Now we consider the premises of that theory from a 
different angle—not as a theory of precedent, but as a theory of persuasive 
authority. Lower court judges may view the opinions of the Supreme 
Court as persuasive because they provide a basis for predicting the future 
behavior of the Court and hence the likelihood that the Court would 
reverse a lower court‘s decision. Lower court judges may wish to avoid 
reversal, even if they reject the bad man theory of law.
139
 
Fourth, opinions of the Justices may have what we might call 
―legitimating authority.‖ Given our legal culture, legal arguments may be 
viewed as requiring sources that confer legitimate authority. A 
constitutional argument is legitimate if it is sound or cogent and premised 
on the constitutional text or the holding of a Supreme Court case. On the 
other hand, a constitutional argument that reasoned from the writings of 
Karl Marx or Ayn Rand might be thought to lack legitimacy. Given our 
legal culture, arguments based on Supreme Court dicta or on concurring or 
dissenting opinions of individual Justices are legitimating—these are 
legitimate sources of authority within the complex argumentative practice 
of law. 
 
 
 137. Alvin Goldman, Social Epistemology, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Aug. 18, 
2006), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/sum2010/entries/epistemology-social/. 
 138. See generally Robert Pierson, The Epistemic Authority of Expertise, 1 PSA: PROC. OF THE 
BIENNIAL MEETING OF THE PHIL. OF SCI. ASS‘N 398 (1994). 
 139. See supra text accompanying notes 108–11. 
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Putting these pieces together, we might postulate that the full 
persuasive authority of a nonbinding Supreme Court opinion is a complex 
function of the reasons it provides, the epistemic authority of the author 
and those who join the opinion, the predictive value of the opinion, and its 
legitimating effect. Different judges may have different ―persuasion 
functions‖—some may count reasons heavily and predictive value lightly, 
or vice versa. Nonetheless, it seems reasonable to believe that reasons 
supported by recent opinions joined by five Supreme Court Justices will 
be viewed as having epistemic authority, predictive value, and legitimating 
authority—at least, pro tanto. 
In the discussion that follows, we will be examining the relationship 
between the opinions in NFIB and the constitutional gestalt. That 
discussion will be based on the role of those opinions in the complex 
practice of constitutional argument and the relationship between that 
practice and constitutional politics. The legal effect of the Commerce 
Clause reasoning of the Chief Justice and the joint dissent is likely to be 
disputed.
140
 Holdings are not merely persuasive; they are binding on lower 
courts. There are arguments for the assertion that the reasoning of Chief 
Justice Roberts and the joint dissent on the Commerce Clause gives rise to 
a holding. But these arguments can be contested, and in the dialectical 
process of argumentation, the fallback position of litigants that rely on the 
Commerce Clause reasoning is likely to be that it constitutes persuasive 
authority. In that process, the epistemic authority of the Justices, the 
predictive value of five votes, and the legitimating authority of the 
institutional role of the Justices are all likely to play a role. Of course, 
persuasive authority is only persuasive—it can be overcome by the 
balance of reasons. But the combination of epistemic, predictive, and 
legitimating authority can change the context in which reasons are 
evaluated, making reasons that would be ―off the wall‖ without such 
persuasive authority into reasons that are ―on the wall‖ and hence 
potentially warrant changes in the law.
141
 And it is unquestionably true 
that in cases of first impression, the lower federal courts can change the 
law, by resolving an unsettled question in a way that sets a precedent for 
future cases. 
 
 
 140. See supra Part III.B. 
 141. JACK M. BALKIN, CONTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD 
174–225 (2011); Jack M. Balkin, From Off the Wall to On the Wall: How the Mandate Challenge 
Went Mainstream, THE ATLANTIC (June 4, 2012, 2:55 PM), http://www.theatlantic.com/national/ 
archive/2012/06/from-off-the-wall-to-on-the-wall-how-the-mandate-challenge-went-mainstream/2580 
40. 
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C. Constitutional Gestalts 
When viewed from a distance, the system of norms that govern the 
complex practice of constitutional argument can be seen as organized into 
large-scale patterns. These patterns can be represented in various ways, 
including doctrinal summaries, normative theories, and narratives. Further, 
particular cases may be considered canonical: the canonical cases are 
paradigms; their reasoning and outcomes can be used as premises in 
constitutional argument.
142
 
At any given time, there may be a dominant constitutional gestalt—an 
overall picture of the constitutional landscape, either as a whole or in some 
particular domain. It is important to understand that the constitutional 
gestalt does not settle all constitutional questions. Given the dominant 
constitutional gestalt, some territory may be mapped as disputed—subject 
to contestation in constitutional litigation and in interactions between the 
various branches of government. Given the same dominant constitutional 
gestalt, other territory may be mapped as beyond dispute—outside the 
bounds of constitutional contestation because of settled constitutional 
norms. 
It may be helpful to provide a visual representation of the idea of a 
constitutional gestalt in terms of three related ideas: (1) constitutional 
doctrines, (2) normative constitutional theories, and (3) constitutional 
narratives:  
 
 
 142. The notion of a constitutional gestalt should be distinguished from the idea of a ―paradigm‖ 
or ―constitutional paradigm.‖ Although the word ―paradigm‖ in its primary sense is simply that of an 
example or central case, there is a related idea of paradigms that is derived from the work of Thomas 
Kuhn in the philosophy of science. See THOMAS S. KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTIONS (3d ed. 1996). A Kuhnian paradigm consists of ―consensus on exemplary instances of 
scientific research,‖ that in turn gives rise to an agreement on such further fundamentals as particular 
theories, procedures, instrumentation, and scientific language. Alexander Bird, Thomas Kuhn, 
STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Aug. 11, 2011), http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/fall 
2013/entries/thomas-kuhn/. In the legal context, the analogue of a Kuhnian paradigm would be a case, 
or set of cases, that serves as the focal point of agreement among the community of legal practitioners. 
Agreement on a set of canonical cases could in turn give rise to agreement on other basic ideas, 
including legal-argument types, styles of opinion writing, and citation practices. Although there are 
affinities between the notion of a constitutional paradigm and a constitutional gestalt, the two concepts 
have distinct content and functional expressions. For discussion of Kuhn‘s idea of a paradigm and 
constitutional interpretation, see Ian Bartrum, Constitutional Value Judgments and Interpretive Theory 
Choice, 40 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 259 (2013). 
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FIGURE 1: CONSTITUTIONAL GESTALTS 
 
Figure 1 represents the relationship between gestalt, doctrine, theory, 
and narrative as a hierarchy of abstraction. Constitutional gestalts are 
highly abstract representations of the content of constitutional doctrines, 
theories, and narratives. (For the purpose of this discussion, the phrase 
―constitutional doctrine‖ is used in an inclusive sense that incorporates 
both judicially created doctrines and constitutional norms and practices 
that arise outside the courts.) 
Consider the subset of constitutional doctrine that defines national 
legislative power. The content of the doctrine as a whole is the conjunction 
of the content of a multitude of particular constitutional rules. That content 
can itself be described at various levels of generality. At the level of detail, 
there will be highly particularized rules governing specific kinds of 
legislative action (e.g., rules defining an excise tax). At the highest level of 
abstraction, there will be rules that attempt to capture the structural 
features of the detail (e.g., the rational basis test). The constitutional 
gestalt is not a theory of the doctrine—although such theories may be 
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supported or undermined by the gestalt. Rather, the gestalt organizes our 
perception of cases, rules, and doctrinal theories.
143
 
Similarly, we can construct constitutional narratives about the 
development of national legislative power. One such narrative prominently 
features the resolution of the conflict between President Roosevelt and the 
Supreme Court. This version emphasizes 1937, telling a story of the events 
that led to the Supreme Court‘s decision in NLRB v. Jones and Laughlin 
Steel Corp.
144
 and to subsequent decisions (e.g., Wickard v. Filburn
145
) and 
assertions of national legislative power (e.g., the Great Society
146
). Such 
narratives can be vindicating or debunking. A vindicating narrative tells a 
story that places a vector of constitutional development in a normatively 
favorable light, whereas a debunking narrative tells the story in a way that 
puts the vector in a normatively unfavorable light. The same set of events 
could be the subject of clashing narratives, some of which are vindicating, 
while others are debunking.
147
 
Vindicating and debunking narratives are normatively charged, but 
there is another category of narrative, which we might dub ―causal,‖ that 
focuses on causal relationships between actions and events—although a 
causal narrative might also have normative implicatures.
148
 A 
constitutional gestalt is not a narrative, but it may make some narratives 
salient and plausible and other narratives beside the point or implausible. 
Finally, we can construct normative constitutional theories. 
Originalism is such a theory: in one prominent version, it argues that 
constitutional practice should be constrained by the original public 
meaning of the text.
149
 In the context of the Commerce Clause, most 
versions of originalism are critical of the basic contours of current 
 
 
 143. My understanding of the relationship between the constitutional gestalt and doctrines is 
indebted to Duncan Kennedy‘s account of the phenomenology of judging. See DUNCAN KENNEDY, A 
CRITIQUE OF ADJUDICATION: FIN DE SIÈCLE (1998); Duncan Kennedy, Freedom and Constraint in 
Adjudication: A Critical Phenomenology, in CRITICAL LEGAL STUDIES 45 (James Boyle ed., 1992). 
 144. 301 U.S. 1 (1937). 
 145. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 146. ―The Great Society‖ is the name given by Lyndon Johnson to his legislative agenda. See 
JOHN A. ANDREW III, LYNDON JOHNSON AND THE GREAT SOCIETY (1998). 
 147. There is a third possibility: constitutional history could be neutral. On the role of 
constitutional narratives, see Lawrence B. Solum, Narrative, Normativity, and Causation, 2010 MICH. 
ST. L. REV. 597. 
 148. Implicature refers to saying one thing but meaning something else. See Wayne Davis, 
Implicature, STANFORD ENCYCLOPEDIA OF PHILOSOPHY (Sept. 22, 2010), http://plato.stanford.edu/ 
archives/spr2013/entries/implicature. 
 149. See Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, supra note 129, at 1–36. 
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doctrine.
150
 But one prominent public meaning originalist, Jack Balkin, 
provides a normative defense of the kind of Commerce Clause doctrine 
offered in Justice Ginsburg‘s opinion in NFIB.151  
Normative constitutional theories come in many shapes and sizes, 
ranging from Ronald Dworkin‘s theory of law as integrity, which sees 
constitutional law as a function of the normative theory that best fits and 
justifies the law as a whole,
152
 to meso- or micro-level normative accounts 
of particular clauses, statutes, regulations, or cases. Constitutional gestalts 
are not normative constitutional theories, but such theories may be more or 
less consistent with the constitutional gestalt. During periods in which 
there is a dominant constitutional gestalt, the plausibility of normative 
theories will depend, in part, on their consistency with the gestalt. 
Normative theories that justify all or most of the constitutional gestalt will 
be seen as more likely to be true or at least reasonable; theories that call 
for radical revisions of the gestalt are likely to be seen as false and 
unreasonable. 
Constitutional gestalts operate at a level of abstraction that floats above 
doctrines, theories, and narratives. You might think of a constitutional 
gestalt as the big picture that integrates a high-level description of doctrine 
with vindicating narratives and justifying normative theories. Gestalts 
organize our perceptions of particulars, but the content of the gestalt is not 
identical to the content of the particulars. A gestalt view of national 
legislative power relates generalizations about constitutional doctrine 
(e.g., the commerce power is virtually plenary and subject to rational basis 
scrutiny) to normative theories (e.g., the scope of national power should 
be decided by an elected body) and vindicating narratives (e.g., expansive 
Commerce Clause doctrine emerged from a conflict between an 
antidemocratic Supreme Court and a President and Congress vested with 
extraordinary constitutional authority by ‗We the People‘). 
Gestalts organize the content of doctrines, theories, and narratives—
they frame our perceptions. Because a gestalt is not the content it frames, 
it is difficult to capture a gestalt as an explicit set of propositions. Slogans 
 
 
 150. See, e.g., Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. L. 
REV. 101, 105–06 (2001); Richard A. Epstein, Constitutional Faith and the Commerce Clause, 71 
NOTRE DAME L. REV. 167, 189–91 (1996); Robert J. Pushaw, Jr., Methods of Interpreting the 
Commerce Clause: A Comparative Analysis, 55 ARK. L. REV. 1185, 1199 (2003). 
 151. JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 138–82 (2011); Jack M. Balkin, Commerce, 109 
MICH. L. REV. 1 (2010). For a critique of Balkin‘s theory, see Randy E. Barnett, Jack Balkin‘s 
Interaction Theory of ―Commerce,‖ 2012 U. ILL. L. REV. 623. 
 152. RONALD DWORKIN, TAKING RIGHTS SERIOUSLY 105–30 (1977); RONALD DWORKIN, LAW‘S 
EMPIRE 379–99 (1986). 
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may be useful, even when the slogan is obviously wrong at the level of 
detail: for example, the statement ―Commerce Clause power is virtually 
unlimited‖ is a good slogan but not a helpful description at a fine-grained 
level of detail. Metaphors may also be useful: for example, ―islands of 
state sovereignty in a sea of federal power.‖153 Slogans and metaphors can 
represent the gist of a constitutional gestalt, but the gestalt itself is a 
mental or conceptual construct that organizes perceptions of the legal 
materials. 
The idea of a constitutional gestalt can be clarified by invoking the 
familiar distinction between the internal and external point of view.
154
 
Imagine a hypothetical judge, Alice, whose perceptions of constitutional 
doctrine are shaped by a constitutional gestalt. When Alice engages in 
constitutional practice (e.g., deliberates in the course of deciding a case), 
she can and characteristically will engage the legal materials (cases and 
clauses) from the internal point of view—and that point of view will have 
been shaped by the constitutional gestalt. Now imagine a hypothetical 
scholar, Ben, who wants to explain Alice‘s decisions. Ben can attempt to 
reconstruct the constitutional gestalt that shaped Alice‘s understandings of 
the law from the external point of view. For Ben, the constitutional gestalt 
is a feature of Alice‘s cognitive apparatus. Ben can reconstruct the content 
of the gestalt by taking up Alice‘s point of view as a participant observer 
in constitutional practice. 
Some of the most interesting developments in constitutional practice 
occur during periods of gestalt shift—when one picture gives way to 
another. The mechanisms by which such shifts occur may be various. A 
constitutional gestalt shift might sneak up on the community of 
constitutional actors—their perception of the overall pattern might 
gradually change without their even noticing. But constitutional gestalt 
shifts can also be the subject of intense constitutional contestation. Such 
contestation may occur in constitutional litigation, or it might occur 
through the articulation of constitutional visions outside the courts. In 
some cases, perhaps typically, a constitutional gestalt shift will be the 
subject of contestation in multiple locations. Arguments may occur in the 
public sphere, in the legal academy, in legislative and executive forums 
within both state and national political institutions, and in the courts of 
law. 
 
 
 153. Randy E. Barnett, Commentary, William Rehnquist, CATO INSTITUTE (Sept. 6, 2005), 
http://www.cato.org/publications/commentary/william-rehnquist. 
 154. See H. L. A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 89–91 (2d ed. 1994). 
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We can represent the process of constitutional contestation visually as 
the relationship between overlapping fields (or arenas) of discourse:  
FIGURE 2: THE FIELD OF CONSTITUTIONAL CONTESTATION 
 
The influence of a judicial opinion, such as NFIB, on the process of 
contestation will vary with the context; different fields of discouse may be 
governed by different norms. For example, contestation via formal legal 
arguments presented to courts will be heavily influenced by judicial 
opinions because the conventions of the complex argumentative practice 
give substantial weight to precedent, especially the decisions of the 
Supreme Court on constitutional issues. In other forums, Supreme Court 
opinions may play a less direct or less constraining role, such as in public 
political discourse among citizens, where the opinions of the Supreme 
Court may be ignored or subject to intense criticism. Constitutional 
contestation can be structured by a dominant constitutional gestalt, but 
when the gestalt itself is contested, there may be a complex relationship 
among constitutional arguments presented within the various sites of 
constitutional contestation. 
When a gestalt shift occurs, our big picture view of the constitutional 
landscape changes. Contested territory becomes settled. Undisputed norms 
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Discourse 
Formal Legal 
Argument 
Academic 
Disputation 
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are questioned. Constitutional arguments that once passed the laugh test 
become subject to ridicule. Arguments that once were ―off the wall‖ are 
now seen as ―on the wall.‖ A familiar visual image conveys the notion of a 
gestalt shift vividly:
155
 
FIGURE 3: DUCK RABBIT 
 
 
This is the ―duck rabbit,‖ which appeared in Popular Science,156 was 
made famous by Ludwig Wittgenstein in the Philosophical 
Investigations
157
 and has been memorialized in popular culture as the 
theme of sitcom episodes
158
 and on beer labels.
159
 When perceptions of the 
image move from duck to rabbit or vice versa, a gestalt shift has occurred. 
Constitutional gestalt shifts are more complex than the simple duck-to-
rabbit or rabbit-to-duck image shift. The relevant objects of constitutional 
perception are multitudinous in number and complex in structure. Indeed, 
if the relevant constitutional data (bits of constitutional text, arguments by 
lawyers, reasons in opinions, pronouncements by nonjudicial officials, and 
 
 
 155. The image is available via Wikimedia Commons. File:Kaninchen und Ente.png, WIKIMEDIA 
COMMONS (Aug. 7, 2012, 4:35 PM), http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/File:Kaninchen_und_Ente.png. 
 156. Joseph Jastrow, The Mind‘s Eye, 54 POPULAR SCI. MONTHLY 299, 312 (1899). 
 157. LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, PHILOSOPHICAL INVESTIGATIONS 194 (G. E. M. Anscombe trans., 
Basil Blackwell 1963).  
 158. How I Met Your Mother: Rabbit or Duck (CBS television broadcast Feb. 8, 2010). 
 159. THE DUCK-RABBIT CRAFT BREWERY, http://www.duckrabbitbrewery.com (last visited Oct. 
21, 2013). 
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so forth) are viewed one-by-one as particulars, the resulting mass of 
relevant inputs into the practice of constitutional argument is both vast and 
chaotic. Constitutional gestalts (supported by doctrinal theories, normative 
constitutional theories, and narratives) organize multitudinous, complex 
constitutional particulars into relatively simple pictures composed of a 
manageable set of elements. 
D. Competing Constitutional Gestalts: Understandings of the New Deal 
Settlement 
In NFIB, the United States Supreme Court heard six hours of oral 
argument over three days.
160
 The plaintiff-respondents argued that the 
Supreme Court should affirm the Eleventh Circuit and invalidate the ACA, 
arguably the most important piece of social legislation since the Great 
Society programs of the 1960s. When the litigation began, almost all 
observers argued that this challenge bordered on the frivolous, perhaps 
even triggering Rule 11 sanctions.
161
 After oral argument, perceptions had 
changed, and many observers predicted that the challenge to the ACA 
would prevail.
162
 
What happened? Undoubtedly, many things. Jack Balkin has observed 
that politics and political parties played an important role, perhaps the 
crucial role, in combination with intellectual and social movements.
163
 But 
the role of political institutions is mediated by constitutional 
understandings that help to shape the space within which politics can 
operate. The constitutional challenge to the ACA began its journey to the 
Supreme Court in an intellectual environment shaped by a constitutional 
 
 
 160. BLACKMAN, supra note 14, at xxiii. 
 161. See BLACKMAN, supra note 14, at 185; David A. Hyman, Why Did Law Professors 
Misunderestimate the Lawsuits Against PPACA?, 2013 U. ILL. L. REV. (forthcoming), available at 
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=2224364; Andrew Koppelman, Bad News for Mail 
Robbers: The Obvious Constitutionality of Health Care Reform, 121 YALE L.J. ONLINE 1, 10 n.50 
(2011), http://yalelawjournal.org/2011/04/26/koppelman.html; Akhil Reed Amar, Op-Ed., Constitutional 
Showdown: A Florida Judge Distorted the Law in Striking down Healthcare Reform, L.A. TIMES, Feb. 
6, 2011, at A25; Randy Barnett, A Weird Victory for Federalism, SCOTUSBLOG (June 28, 2012, 12:56 
PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/06/a-weird-victory-for-federalism/; Ezra Klein, Reagan‘s 
solicitor general: ‗Health care is interstate commerce. Is this a regulation of it? Yes. End of story.‘, 
WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Mar. 28, 2012, 1:09 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/wonk 
blog/post/reagans-solicitor-general-health-care-is-interstate-commerce-is-this-a-regulation-of-it-yes-end-
of-story/2011/08/25/gIQAmaQigS_blog.html. 
 162. See, e.g., Sarah Kliff, Neal Katyal on defending Obamacare, WASH. POST WONKBLOG (Mar. 
28, 2012, 2:36 PM), http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/ezra-klein/post/neal-katyal-on-defending-
obamacare/2012/03/28/gIQAHpksgS_blog.html. 
 163. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL REDEMPTION, supra note 141, 174–225; Balkin, From Off the 
Wall to On the Wall, supra note 141. 
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gestalt that structured the field of constitutional argument. This journey 
ended with the Supreme Court itself caught in the midst of a potential 
gestalt shift. 
1. Gestalt One: The Dynamic New Deal Settlement 
The New Deal Settlement is a familiar trope in constitutional 
discourse,
164
 sometimes associated with footnote four in United States v. 
Carolene Products Co.
165
 The New Deal Settlement was the product of a 
complex set of actions and events, including legislation, presidential 
speeches, and judicial decisions. One might think of the New Deal 
Settlement as constitutional doctrine, articulated in Supreme Court 
decisions and further refined in legal scholarship and lower court opinions. 
But for the purposes of this Article, I want to look at the New Deal 
Settlement as a central organizing idea within a constitutional gestalt—the 
big picture and not the doctrinal details. One might limit the New Deal 
Settlement chronologically to the Roosevelt presidency, perhaps with an 
extension for Truman. But for our purposes, we will focus on an extended 
period that begins with 1937 and extends to include Warren and Burger 
Court decisions and Great Society legislation. Finally, we shall focus only 
on congressional power pursuant to the Commerce Clause and the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, although the New Deal Settlement also 
includes positions on individual rights and separation of powers. 
During the period covered by the extended New Deal Settlement, 
Commerce Clause doctrine was fairly complex. The constitutional gestalt 
was much simpler. The core idea of the gestalt was that Congress had 
plenary and virtually unlimited legislative power—subject, of course, to 
the limits imposed by the individual rights provisions of the 
Constitution.
166
 The gestalt was a summary (though not necessarily an 
accurate summary
167
) of many particular doctrines, their interactions, and 
 
 
 164. See Charles H. Clarke, Supreme Court Assault on the Constitutional Settlement of the New 
Deal: Garcia and National League of Cities, 6 N. ILL. U. L. REV. 39, 79 (1986); Kenneth T. Cuccinelli, 
II, et al., Why the Debate over the Constitutionality of the Federal Health Care Law Is About Much 
More than Health Care, 15 TEX. REV. L. & POL. 293, 323 (2011); Norman R. Williams, The People‘s 
Constitution, 57 STAN. L. REV. 257, 281–82 (2004) (reviewing LARRY D. KRAMER, THE PEOPLE 
THEMSELVES: POPULAR CONSTITUTIONALISM AND JUDICIAL REVIEW (2004)). 
 165. Larry D. Kramer, The Supreme Court 2000 Term—Foreword: We the Court, 115 HARV. L. 
REV. 4, 14 (2001); see also United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 n.4 (1938). 
 166. See supra note 9 (collecting references to Congress‘s virtually unlimited power). 
 167. I owe special thanks to Laura Donohue for emphasizing the idea that the gestalt may be 
based on an inaccurate account of the doctrine or a factually incorrect constitutional narrative. Given 
the nature of a constitutional gestalt, this possibility is not surprising. Gestalts are simplifying pictures 
and not complete and accurate historical narratives. 
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the effects they produced. These doctrines included the presumption of 
constitutionality, the rational basis test, and the cumulative effects test 
articulated in Wickard v. Filburn.
168
 The gestalt provided a heuristic for 
interpreting the individual doctrines and their interrelationships. Because 
of its very nature, the gestalt was a simplifying representation of the state 
of the doctrine. The gestalt was formulated in terms of ―virtually 
unlimited‖ national legislative power. It might turn out that the general 
picture of plenary and virtually unlimited power was inaccurate as to some 
details. The fabric of national legislative power might have a rip here and a 
tear there, but such gaps were viewed as contestable anomalies. 
Arguments for minor alterations in doctrine that would mend the tears 
were on the table. However, arguments for the wholesale expansion of 
these holes in the fabric of plenary and unlimited power were ―off the 
wall.‖ Therefore, we can characterize the constitutional gestalt as the 
―Dynamic New Deal Settlement‖ with doctrine growing and changing so 
as to accommodate expansions in national power. Expansions were 
initiated by Congress and the President and then ratified by the Supreme 
Court in the event they were challenged. 
The New Federalism cases decided by the Rehnquist Court posed a 
challenge to the constitutional gestalt that read the New Deal Settlement as 
creating plenary and unlimited national legislative power. In particular, 
United States v. Lopez
169
 and United States v. Morrison
170
 reasoned from 
premises that were inconsistent with the then prevailing constitutional 
gestalt. Before these cases were decided, the prevailing view was that 
these challenges would fail, and after the challenges succeeded, the 
predominant reaction was to fit them into the gestalt. One strategy was to 
characterize these decisions as incoherent and hence, as without generative 
force.
171
 Another strategy was to suggest that these cases were merely 
symbolic reminders by the Supreme Court to Congress of the theoretical 
limits on legislative powers.
172
 A third approach was to characterize 
Gonzales v. Raich
173
 as depriving Lopez and Morrison of generative 
 
 
 168. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 169. 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 170. 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 171. See, e.g., Christy H. Dral & Jerry J. Phillips, Commerce by Another Name: The Impact of 
United States v. Lopez and United States v. Morrison, 68 TENN. L. REV. 605, 616 (2001) (stating that 
―lower courts are left to decipher an incoherent and unworkable rule under the standards articulated in 
Lopez and reiterated in Morrison‖). 
 172. See, e.g., Louis H. Pollak, Foreword, 94 MICH. L. REV. 533, 541, 553 (1995) (suggesting that 
Lopez may be ―merely anecdotal‖). 
 173. 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
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force,
174
 while a fourth and final strategy characterized these decisions as 
exceptional carve-outs from the general rule of unlimited congressional 
power.
175
 One version of this latter strategy emphasized that any limits 
imposed by Lopez and Morrison could be circumvented via the spending 
power.
176
 
The attitude of the conventional constitutional gestalt to the New 
Federalism decisions can be expressed metaphorically. Imagine a sea of 
federal power that spans the globe. The New Federalism decisions of the 
Rehnquist Court created islands of state power, including the anti-
commandeering principle of Printz v. United States
177
 and New York v. 
United States,
178
 the expanded Eleventh Amendment sovereign immunity 
doctrine of Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman,
179
 and the 
Lopez and Morrison limits on the Commerce Clause. Thus, the prevailing 
gestalt underwent modification—the ocean of federal power was dotted 
with isolated islands of state sovereignty—but the basic pattern (the sea of 
federal power) remained intact.
180
 
2. Gestalt Two: The Frozen New Deal Settlement 
But there is another way to understand the New Federalism decisions. 
Although the dominant constitutional gestalt postulated virtually 
unconstrained national legislative power, Congress had never exercised 
most of the power that was theoretically available to it. State law 
continued to govern most of life, for individuals and institutions. Even 
after the New Deal, the pervasive nature of state power is exemplified in 
 
 
 174. See, e.g., Thane Rehn, Note, RICO and the Commerce Clause: A Reconsideration of the 
Scope of Federal Criminal Law, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 1991, 2018 (2008) (―[L]ower courts have tended 
to interpret [Gonzales v. Raich] as removing any significant limits on congressional power that might 
have been put in place by Lopez and Morrison.‖). 
 175. See, e.g., Jesse H. Choper, Taming Congress‘s Power Under the Commerce Clause: What 
Does the Near Future Portend?, 55 ARK. L. REV. 731, 765 (2003) (describing Lopez and Morrison as 
―carving out areas of state sovereignty‖). 
 176. See Lynn A. Baker, Conditional Federal Spending After Lopez, 95 COLUM. L. REV. 1911, 
1974–75 (1995); Richard E. Levy, Federalism: The Next Generation, 33 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1629, 
1643 (2000); see also Thomas R. McCoy & Barry Friedman, Conditional Spending: Federalism‘s 
Trojan Horse, 1988 SUP. CT. REV. 85, 116 (―[A]ny time that Congress finds itself limited by [its] 
delegated regulatory powers . . . Congress need only attach a condition on a federal spending grant that 
achieves the same (otherwise invalid) regulatory objective.‖). 
 177. 521 U.S. 898, 933 (1997). 
 178. 505 U.S. 144, 188 (1992). 
 179. 451 U.S. 1 (1981). 
 180. As stated, the metaphor does not account for zones of concurrent state and federal power. We 
can modify the metaphor by specifying that the ocean of federal power is the zone in which Congress 
has power to act, or we might add marshes and swamps to represent zones of concurrent power. 
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the fields of criminal law, common law tort, property, and contract, family 
law, corporate law, and insurance regulation. Moreover, there was a 
mismatch between the big picture gestalt and the micro-level details of 
constitutional doctrine. For example, New Deal and Warren Court 
opinions continued to pay lip service to the scheme of limited and 
enumerated powers in Article One of the Constitution.
181
 These anomalies 
constituted the raw materials from which an alternative constitutional 
gestalt could be wrought. 
From the perspective of the conventional constitutional gestalt, it might 
appear that the alternative gestalt would necessarily involve a return to the 
so-called ―Constitution in exile‖:182 in the context of national legislative 
power, that would imply the invalidation of much of the New Deal and 
Great Society legislation that constitutes the contemporary regulatory 
state. That is a possible alternative constitutional program, but it is 
radically implausible as an alternative gestalt. The constitutional gestalt is 
a simplifying picture of constitutional practice, as it exists. As such, it 
must incorporate the facts that form the basis of the narrative of the New 
Deal Settlement.
183
 
For this reason, the alternative gestalt must somehow incorporate the 
broad outlines of constitutional doctrine and the existing structure of 
constitutional practice. The alternative gestalt must accept the legal rules 
generated by the New Deal Settlement, as those rules currently exist. But 
the alternative gestalt is not required to endorse a dynamic understanding 
of the content of the settlement. The resulting alternative can be 
summarized as a slogan, ―[t]his far, and no farther.‖184 The most radical 
 
 
 181. See, e.g., Maryland v. Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 196 (1968) (Warren Court case stating ―the 
power to regulate commerce, though broad indeed, has limits‖); Santa Cruz Fruit Packing Co. v. 
N.L.R.B., 303 U.S. 453, 466 (1938) (New Deal era case stating ―The subject of federal power is still 
‗commerce,‘ and not all commerce but commerce with foreign nations and among the several states.‖). 
 182. Randy Barnett, Academic Reaction to Oral Argument on the ACA Challenge, VOLOKH 
CONSPIRACY (Apr. 30, 2012, 10:55 AM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/04/30/academic-reaction-to-
oral-argument-on-the-aca-challenge/; Jeffrey Rosen, The Unregulated Offensive, N.Y. TIMES MAG., 
Apr. 17, 2005, available at http://www.nytimes.com/2005/04/17/magazine/17CONSTITUTION.html? 
_r=1; Jeffrey Rosen, How New Is the New Textualism?, 25 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 43 (2013). 
 183. Of course, the current constitutional gestalt can be challenged. Thus, Justice Thomas argued 
in his separate dissenting opinion that the substantial effects doctrine of Wickard v. Filburn should be 
overruled. See supra Part II.C.7; see also NFIB v. Sebelius, 132 S. Ct. 2566, 2677 (2012) (Thomas, J., 
dissenting). Likewise, originalists may argue that the New Deal Settlement is consistent with the 
original meaning of the constitutional text. See Jamal Greene, Fourteenth Amendment Originalism, 71 
MD. L. REV. 978, 1013 n.159 (2012) (―[M]any modern originalists accept much of the Warren Court‘s 
corpus but are comfortable revisiting the New Deal settlement, which tended to rein in the Fourteenth 
Amendment‘s jurisgenerative capacity.‖).  
 184. See Randy Barnett, ―This Far and No Farther‖: Baselines and the Individual Insurance 
Mandate, VOLOKH CONSPIRACY (Jan. 22, 2012, 3:00 PM), http://www.volokh.com/2012/01/22/this-
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New Deal cases (e.g., Wickard v. Filburn
185
) are seen as wrong in 
principle but settled in practice. The New Federalism cases are seen as a 
substantial correction in the course of constitutional doctrine and not as 
mere symbols or carve-outs. The constitutionality of preexisting New Deal 
and Great Society legislation is taken as a given, but the constitutionality 
of new federal programs is not taken for granted. 
Returning to our oceanic metaphor, the alternative gestalt admits the 
existence of a great sea of federal power but insists that there are whole 
continents of exclusive state authority above the high tide line. Of course, 
the shape of the continents is largely the result of historical accident. The 
coastlines are not smooth geometric shapes. There are peninsulas of state 
authority almost surrounded by federal power. There are great bays and 
fjords, where federal authority extends deep into the reserves of state 
power. Preserving the status quo is not a matter of elegant doctrines 
constituted by a few distinctions rooted in a general theory of federalism. 
At the doctrinal level, the alternative gestalt sanctions and encourages 
categorical distinctions that may seem arbitrary if evaluated in isolation, 
one by one. From the perspective of the alternative constitutional gestalt, 
these seemingly arbitrary categorical distinctions make sense when viewed 
from a distance. They freeze the New Deal Settlement, as it exists here and 
now—this far, but no farther. 
What is the relationship of the alternative constitutional gestalt to 
originalism? Originalism itself is really a family of constitutional 
theories.
186
 Nonetheless, we can identify two ideas at the core of the 
various versions of originalism: (1) the thesis that the communicative 
content of the Constitution was fixed at the time each provision was 
framed and ratified (the ―fixation thesis‖); and (2) the principle that 
constitutional doctrine and practice should be constrained by the original 
meaning of the Constitution (the ―constraint principle‖).187  
Many originalists believe that the New Deal cases expanded 
Congress‘s Commerce Clause power beyond the limits of original 
meaning.
188
 But as a political matter, it would be all but impossible and 
 
 
far-and-no-farther-baselines-and-the-individual-insurance-mandate. 
 185. 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 186. See Solum, We Are All Originalists Now, supra note 129, at 35–36. 
 187. Lawrence B. Solum, Faith and Fidelity: Originalism and the Possibility of Constitutional 
Redemption, 91 TEX. L. REV. 147, 156 (2012) (reviewing JACK M. BALKIN, CONSTITUTIONAL 
REDEMPTION: POLITICAL FAITH IN AN UNJUST WORLD (2011) and JACK M. BALKIN, LIVING 
ORIGINALISM (2011)). 
 188. See generally Randy E. Barnett, The Original Meaning of the Commerce Clause, 68 U. CHI. 
L. REV. 101 (2001). 
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certainly costly to undo New Deal and Great Society legislation or to 
amend the Constitution to authorize those programs. 
Given that a thoroughly originalist jurisprudence is infeasible (at least 
in the short to medium run), some originalists endorse the idea that there 
can be an ―originalist second best‖: given the practical impossibility of the 
first-best originalist interpretation of the Commerce Clause, the originalist 
might argue for doctrines that limit departures from original meaning to 
those required by practical necessity.
189
 Such doctrines mitigate the 
damage done to original meaning by precedent and practice. Therefore, the 
alternative gestalt, the Frozen New Deal Settlement, would stand in a 
relationship of mutual support with a normative constitutional theory that 
supports freezing the limits of national legislative power as a 
constitutional second best. 
E. NFIB and the Possibility of a Constitutional Gestalt Shift 
We have hypothesized two competing constitutional gestalts. The 
dominant gestalt postulates plenary and unlimited national legislative 
power; the alternative gestalt endorses the notion of enumerated and 
limited congressional powers but acknowledges the irreversibility of the 
New Deal and Great Society legislative programs.  
Constitutional gestalts do not play a direct role in constitutional 
litigation. You cannot cite a gestalt in a brief. The Supreme Court has 
never directly referred to the New Deal Settlement—no court has used the 
phrase in a reported decision. Constitutional gestalts shape our perceptions 
of constitutional argument, but they are not arguments themselves. Given 
the dominant constitutional gestalt, arguing that the individual mandate 
was unprecedented should not have counted for much: on the conventional 
account, unprecedented assertions of federal power should be 
accommodated within the Dynamic New Deal Settlement. Given the 
 
 
 189. John O. McGinnis & Michael B. Rappaport, Originalism and the Good Constitution, 98 GEO. 
L.J. 1693, 1748–51 (2010); Lawrence B. Solum, Constitutional Possibilities, 83 IND. L.J. 307, 311–12 
(2008) (discussing the general idea of a constitutional second best). Cf. Adrian Vermeule, The 
Supreme Court 2008 Term—Foreword: System Effects and the Constitution, 123 HARV. L. REV. 4, 63 
(2009) (discussing idea of second-best for consequentialist originalists). The notion of an originalist 
second-best can be applied to both outcomes and reasoning. The second-best outcome would be the 
outcome in the feasible choice set that most closely approximates the outcome that would be reached 
on originalist grounds. The second-best reasoning would be the reasoning in the feasible choice set 
that most closely approximate originalist reasons. The feasible choice set could be defined in terms of 
the outcomes and reasoning that can command a majority of the judges on a particular court. I am 
grateful to Megan Degeneffe for the distinction between second-best outcomes and second-best 
reasoning. 
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alternative narrative, arguing that the individual mandate was 
unprecedented was an important move, establishing the predicate for a 
categorical rule that would invalidate the ACA. By contrast, from the 
perspective of the conventional gestalt, the challenge to the individual 
mandate was frivolous. From the alternative perspective, an attack on the 
ACA had a real possibility of success. 
Justice Roberts‘s opinion in NFIB is curious. On the one hand, his 
discussion of the taxing power fits the dominant conventional gestalt. The 
individual mandate should be upheld because policy choices are reserved 
for democratic politics and not for the courts. Even if the ACA is best 
understood as a regulation and not a tax, the Court should adopt a saving 
construction that avoids the constitutional problem. On the other hand, 
Justice Roberts‘s discussion of the Commerce Clause fits the alternative 
gestalt. The individual mandate is beyond the Commerce Clause power 
because it is unprecedented, and the theories under which it is upheld 
imply that national legislative power is virtually unlimited. Justice Roberts 
looks at the picture and sees both a duck and a rabbit. 
The eight remaining members of the Court see either a duck or a rabbit, 
but not both. Justice Ginsburg‘s opinion (joined by Breyer, Sotomayor, 
and Kagan) affirms the dominant constitutional narrative—national 
legislative power is almost unlimited, subject to narrow categorical 
exceptions defined by Lopez and Morrison. The joint dissent authored by 
Justices Kennedy, Scalia, Thomas, and Alito adopts the alternative 
gestalt‘s core principle of limited and enumerated federal powers, 
emphasizing the unprecedented nature of the mandate and framing the 
Rehnquist Court‘s New Federalism decisions as establishing a new gestalt 
(and not merely as narrow categorical exceptions to the rule). 
V. CONCLUSION: A POSSIBLE SHIFT IN THE CONSTITUTIONAL GESTALT 
What will the effects of NFIB be? What are the implications of the 
unusual pattern of opinions and reasons offered in this supremely 
important case? The direct legal effects have already begun to emerge. In 
future constitutional litigation over the spending power, NFIB sets an 
important precedent and opens the door to future challenges of Congress‘s 
power to influence the states through conditional spending. In future 
litigation over national legislative power, the various opinions on the 
Commerce Clause are sure to be cited and their precedential force is sure 
to be disputed. However these disputes are resolved, the grounds of 
constitutional contestation will have changed—the dominant constitutional 
gestalt has become open to challenge through formal legal argument in 
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ordinary litigation and through academic disputation.
190
 From there, the 
influence of the opinions is likely to extend to congressional debate and 
executive deliberation and ultimately to public political discourse. 
There is some evidence that a shift in the constitutional gestalt is 
already underway. In a Fourth Circuit oral argument on Liberty 
University‘s challenge to the Obama administration‘s rule that most 
employers provide contraceptives in their employee health plans, Judge 
Diana Gribbon Motz reportedly stated, ―The Supreme Court opinion puts a 
new light, it seems to me, on the Commerce Clause. . . . It sounds like 
we‘re in a new regime [post] NFIB.‖191 Motz‘s remark is brief, but it is not 
a stretch to interpret ―new regime‖ as some version an alternative 
constitutional gestalt. Greg Magarian recently characterized Justice 
Roberts‘s opinion as ―by far the Court‘s most aggressive posture against 
federal power since the Justices struck down core elements of the New 
Deal seventy-five years ago.‖192  
The current state of the Court with respect to the constitutional gestalt 
could hardly be more evenly divided. Four and one-half Justices adhere to 
the conventional gestalt; four and one-half affirm the alternative view of 
the big picture. Half the Court endorses the dynamic reading of the New 
Deal Settlement; the other half sees the New Deal Settlement as frozen. 
The Court as an institution and Justice Roberts as an individual are caught 
in the exact moment of a constitutional gestalt shift—seeing the rabbit at 
one moment and the duck in the next. But this moment cannot last. The 
constitutional gestalt must eventually settle—one way or the other, 
dynamic or frozen. 
Before the constitutional challenge to the individual mandate, the 
constitutional gestalt seemed settled—not to everyone but to the 
mainstream community of constitutional practitioners and scholars. The 
New Federalism cases had been absorbed into the conventional picture of 
plenary and unlimited national legislative power, now subject to very 
limited categorical exceptions. The challenge to the ACA took advantage 
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of ambiguities in the cases and doctrines organized by the conventional 
gestalt. The plaintiffs argued that the mandate was unprecedented, the 
New Deal cases distinguishable, and the categorical distinctions in the 
New Federalism cases (―economic activity‖) were controlling. The United 
States argued that the mandate had precedents, the spirit of the New Deal 
cases controlled, and the New Federalism cases were distinguishable. If 
the Supreme Court had rejected the challenge by a vote of eight to one, as 
some predicted,
193
 the conventional gestalt would have been decisively 
affirmed. Had the unthinkable happened and the Court had sustained the 
challenge by a similarly lopsided vote, the announcement of the decisions 
would have resounded like a thunderbolt from the heavens, and a 
constitutional revolution of the same magnitude as 1937 would have 
begun. 
But on what was truly the main issue, NFIB did not result in an eight-
to-one decision, or seven-to-two, or six-to-three, or even five-to-four. With 
respect to the constitutional gestalt, the outcome was four and one-half to 
four and one-half, an evenly divided Court. That leaves constitutional law 
in a peculiarly unsettled state. For the partisans of unlimited national 
power, the old gestalt prevails, and hence the old rules govern the complex 
practice of constitutional argument. For them, Justice Roberts was clearly 
right on the tax power and clearly wrong on both the Commerce Clause 
and the spending power; NFIB can be cited for its tax power holding, but 
the Commerce Clause discussion is obiter dictum. For them, the lesson of 
NFIB is clear—the dike held, the barbarians were held at the gate, and the 
banner yet waves. 
For the partisans of limited and enumerated powers, the fact that five 
Justices embraced the alternative gestalt with respect to the Commerce 
Clause in the context of a challenge to an important piece of social 
legislation is profoundly significant. For them, the fact of an equally 
divided Court creates the space for constitutional contestation. A whole set 
of arguments that were ―off the wall‖ is now on the table. NFIB can be 
cited in the lower courts on Commerce Clause issues—five Justices are as 
good as a holding for that purpose. For them, NFIB may even be binding 
Commerce Clause precedent, albeit in a narrow class of cases. For them, 
the game is on. Having fought to a draw on the most unfavorable terrain 
imaginable, they look forward to the next match on a level playing field. 
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NFIB has opened the space for constitutional contestation—and that 
space is already being occupied, in the blogs, at academic conferences, in 
position papers, water cooler discussions, e-mail exchanges, briefs, and 
judicial opinions. Competing doctrinal arguments, theories, and narratives 
are already in play. 
And then what? A shift in the constitutional gestalt requires more than 
arguments in constitutional litigation or theories propounded in law review 
articles, although they may play a role. A shift in the gestalt can only 
occur with supporting developments in constitutional politics off and on 
the Court. The current state of constitutional equipoise is a product of the 
transitory composition of the current Court and a divided government 
reflecting deep political fissures. Things could go one way, or they could 
go another. The dominant gestalt could hold, or we could look back on 
NFIB as a pivotal moment in a constitutional gestalt shift that started with 
the Rehnquist Court‘s New Federalism cases. 
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